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I use measures of structural centrality from network theory to examine whether the 
location of a lead arranger in its network of past syndicate collaborations affects loan 
characteristics and outcomes. I hypothesize that more central lead arrangers have access to better 
information channels that help mitigate adverse selection and moral hazard concerns, and lead to 
improved financing terms. I find that lead centrality is an important factor in explaining both 
price and non-price loan terms. Loans granted by more central lead arrangers charge lower 
spreads than otherwise comparable loans granted by more peripheral arrangers. In addition, more 
central arrangers grant loans that are typically larger, have longer maturities, and have a lower 
incidence of restrictive covenants and collateral requirements than loans granted by peripheral 
arrangers, which suggests that price concessions are not merely substituting for more restrictive 
clauses elsewhere in the contract. To mitigate the potential for alternative explanations for the 
effect of lead centrality on spread, I conduct several cross-sectional tests to determine whether 
the effect is stronger when the value of the information obtained through the network of past 
collaborations is higher. I hypothesize that information obtained through networks of past 
collaborations is higher when the borrower is less transparent and harder to screen, and when the 
lead arranger is ex-ante less informed about the borrower. I find evidence consistent with each of 
these predictions. Finally, I find that controlling for observable risk characteristics, ex-post loan 
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performance increases with the centrality of the lead, which is consistent with central leads 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
I use measures of structural centrality from network theory to examine whether the 
location of a lead arranger in its network of past loan syndicate collaborations affects loan 
characteristics and outcomes. 
The syndicated loan market is an ideal setting in which to study information flows 
through networks of professional collaborations. In a syndicated loan, a bank, acting as a lead 
arranger, typically originates and sells off portions of the loan to other lending institutions. 
Teams in lending institutions engage in long term relationships with each other when they 
repeatedly collaborate in loan syndicates. Lending institutions that collaborate in syndicates must 
agree on the terms of the loan at origination, must coordinate monitoring efforts as the loan 
matures, and must vote on amendments and waiver requests when covenant violations occur. 
The structure of syndicate collaborations can be thought of as a network in which each lending 
institution is a node, and two nodes are connected if they have collaborated in a loan syndicate in 
the past. Characterizing syndicate collaborations as a network is useful because network theory 
has developed a variety of measures that capture the extent to which a node has a more 
influential position in the network, that is, measures of structural centrality (see Freeman (1978 
and Jackson (2010)). Several studies in finance and accounting have began exploring the extent 
to which individuals or firms in more central positions in the network either have access to better 
resources and information channels (see, for example, Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu (2007) and 
Larcker, So, & Wang (2013)), have greater ability to disseminate noisy information (Bajo, 
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Chemmanur, Simonyan, & Tehranian (2016), or use their positions of influence for 
entrenchment purposes (El-Khatib et al., 2015). 
In this study, I hypothesize that lead banks in more central positions in the network of 
past syndicate collaborations have access to better information channels that are valuable in 
pricing debt claims and structuring loan contracts. Specifically, If networks of past syndicate 
collaborations promote information sharing between teams in lending institutions, then a lead 
arranger in a more central position in the network of former syndicate collaborations could be in 
an advantageous position to extract information useful in the valuation of debt claims, relative to 
arrangers in more peripheral positions. 
There are a number of ways in which valuable information could be moving through 
networks of past syndicate collaborations. For example, employees at connected institutions 
could directly share their knowledge about the quality of the borrower, about the prospects of the 
sector, or about the market appetite for specific loans. In addition, the networks could lower the 
cost of gathering information, for instance, it may take fewer calls, or prospective lenders may be 
more forthcoming with their knowledge and expertise when communicating with a former 
syndicate partner. Networks of past collaborations could make it easier for a lead arranger to 
obtain information about similar deals that have recently taken place and this could be helpful 
because comparable deals serve as a useful pricing benchmark. Moreover, the network can assist 
the arranger in obtaining information about the exposures of prospective banks to specific 
industries, geographies, borrowers, as well as changes in credit policies at such banks, all of 
which facilitate the arranging bank’s ability to predict which set of banks are likely to participate 
in the loan and what price will clear the market. 
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Consistent with this argument, several practitioners have noted that the well-
connectedness of a lead arranger with its peer lending institutions is key for loan pricing, and that 
information sharing is the main reason why. For example, when describing the pricing strategies 
of syndicating teams in lead arranger institutions, Campbell & Weaver (2013) pp 260 notes that: 
“Enquiries with other banks can thus be undertaken only on the basis of trust between the 
individuals concerned and it is this feature of the market which is perhaps the most important for 
a syndication unit, the establishment of a rapport with competitors which does not breach the 
competitive spirit of the market (any collusion as to pricing being, of course, unacceptable and 
contrary to competition law) and yet provides for a two-way flow of information”. 1 
Motivated by the above assertions, I seek to explore the extent to which the well-
connectedness of the lead arranger affects loan characteristics and outcomes, an issue that has 
received limited research effort. Some notable exceptions are worth mentioning. First, 
Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons (2012) explores how past social ties between the top management 
teams at banks and borrowing firms affect loan contract terms. Second, Godlewski, Sanditov, & 
Burger-Helmchen (2012) explores the role of bank lending networks as a measure of their 
experience and reputation in a sample of French syndicated deals. Third, a recent study by 
Houston et al., (2017) shows that banks whose directors have more shared social connections 
partner more frequently in the syndicated loan market, and that more central banks in the 
network of social connections take lead roles more frequently in syndicates. 
I expand the above literature by computing measures of lead centrality in the global 
network of syndicate collaborations and exploring how lead centrality measures affect a broad 
set of loan contract terms in a comprehensive sample of 41,447 US loans from 1987 to 2016. I 
                                                 
1 Additional examples of practitioners emphasizing the value of networks of past collaborations are available in Appendix B. 
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find that lead centrality is an important factor in explaining loan contract terms. Specifically, 
loans granted by more central lead arrangers in the network of global syndicate collaborations 
charge a lower loan spread than otherwise comparable loans granted by more peripheral 
arrangers in the network. A one standard deviation increase in the composite measure of lead 
centrality is associated with between an 11 bps and a 13 bps decrease in the loan spread charged. 
This finding is consistent with more central lead arrangers having access to better information 
channels that mitigate financing frictions, and at least part of the information benefits being 
passed on to borrowers in the form of lower loan spreads. 
To reduce concerns that the result of lead centrality on spread is driven by omitted 
correlated variables, I conduct a battery of robustness tests. First, I control for a large set of firm-
, loan- and bank- variables that prior literature has found to predict interest spreads. Second, I 
include several proxies for the reputation of the lead bank holding company based on prior 
literature (Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012; Ross, 2010), and find that the effect of 
centrality on spread remains significantly negative. Third, I drop observations arranged by the 
largest lead bank holding companies, and observations in which there are more than one bank in 
a lead role in the syndicate. Fourth, I estimate a specification that inserts lead arranger fixed 
effects, to control for time invariant lead arranger level con-founders. Fifth, I create a 
dichotomous treatment variable (i.e., High Centrality) and use entropy matching to ensure that 
the covariates are balanced in the treatment and control sub-samples. Sixth, I keep only rated 
firms and estimate a specification with Industry×Rating×Year fixed effects. In all specifications, 
the effect of lead centrality on loan spread remains significantly negative. 
In addition, I find that arrangers in a more central position in the network of past 
syndicate collaborations grant loans that are typically larger, have longer maturities, and have a 
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lower incidence of restrictive covenants and collateral requirements than otherwise comparable 
loans granted by more peripheral arrangers. This is important because showing that non-price 
loan terms such as loan amounts, loan maturities, loan covenants and collateral requirements 
respond to centrality in the same way loan spread does, helps mitigate concerns that any price 
concessions warranted by more central leads are merely substituting for other, more restrictive 
non-price clauses elsewhere in the loan contract. If those trade-offs do occur, then the net effect 
of lead arranger centrality on loan terms becomes uncertain. 
To further substantiate my inferences and mitigate the potential for alternative 
explanations for more central lead arrangers charging a lower loan spread than peripheral 
arrangers, I conduct several additional tests to determine whether the effect of lead centrality on 
spread is stronger when the value of the information obtained through the leads network is likely 
to be higher. 
First, I predict that the information obtained from networks of past syndicate 
collaborations is likely higher when borrowers are relatively less transparent and harder to 
screen. I find evidence consistent with this prediction. Specifically, the effect of lead centrality 
on spread is higher for borrowing firms that are relatively less followed by analysts, for firms 
that do not have an S&P credit rating, for firms in high tech industries, for firms involved in 
R&D activities, and for firms whose financial statements are not audited by a Big5 audit firm. 
Second, I predict that the information obtained from networks of past syndicate 
collaborations is likely higher when the lead lender is ex-ante relatively less informed about the 
borrowing firm. This can occur when the lead arranger is new to the industry of the borrower, 
new to the geography, when the lead arranger is not a local bank, or when the lead arranger is not 
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a relationship bank. Consistent with lead arrangers extracting valuable information through their 
network of past syndicate collaborations, I find evidence supporting each of these predictions. 
Third, I explore the possibility that the effect of lead centrality on spread is primarily 
driven by the ability of more central lead arrangers to use their well-connectedness to mitigate 
‘within syndicate’ information asymmetries (i.e., information asymmetries between better 
informed lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants). I re-run my main analysis, but 
I focus on a sub-sample of loans for which I expect within-syndicate information asymmetries to 
be either low or nonexistent. Specifically, I focus on loans granted to New Firms, that is, loans 
with an origination date that is earlier than three years after the borrowing firms’ IPO, as well as 
loans in which the lead arranger is the sole lender. The effect of lead centrality on loan spread 
remains significantly negative in both of these sub-samples. This mitigates the possibility that the 
effect of lead centrality on loan interest spread is solely driven by more central lead arrangers 
using their well-connectedness to reduce within syndicate information asymmetries, and suggests 
that at least part of the benefits of lead centrality stem from lead arrangers extracting (rather than 
only disseminating) information from their network of past collaborations. 
Finally, I explore the relation between lead centrality and ex post loan performance, in an 
attempt to understand whether the price (and non-price) concessions granted by more central 
lead arrangers are a good decision ex-post. The findings reveal that, controlling for observable 
firm-, loan- and bank- level characteristics, lead arranger centrality is significantly negatively 
associated with the probability that the loan defaults during its life. 
Taken together, this study’s findings contribute to the literature by exploring the extent to 
which loan contract terms are affected by networks of past professional relationships that emerge 
when teams in lending institutions collaborate in loan syndicates. While, as noted above, 
7 
practitioners have emphasized the importance of information flows through networks of lending 
institutions for the success in the loan syndication business, there has been limited research effort 
directed to exploring whether there is broad sample evidence of such assertions. 
8 
CHAPTER 2: RELATED LITERATURE AND PREDICTIONS 
Two streams of literature are the most relevant antecedents to this paper. The first is the 
stream of literature that explores the extent to which social ties between agents and firms have 
implications for capital markets. The second is the emerging literature that uses graph theory and 
measures of structural centrality to capture the extent to which certain individuals or firms have 
better access to resources and information. 
2.1 Inter-personal linkages in finance and accounting 
Numerous studies focus on the role of inter-personal connections and their effect on 
capital markets. For example, Cohen et al., (2008) studies portfolio allocation decisions of 
mutual fund managers that share past educational connections with corporate board members 
(such as when fund managers and corporate board members have a common alma-mater). 
Consistent with connected fund managers having access to better information channels through 
their network of past educational connections, the findings reveal that managers place more 
concentrated bets on connected stocks and that trades on connected positions outperform trades 
on unconnected positions. In a similar vein, Cohen and Malloy, (2010) shows that sell-side 
analysts use their network of past educational connections to gather information about the firms 
that they analyze. The study finds that sell side analyst with shared past educational ties issue 
more accurate recommendations. On the other hand, several studies uncover some of the 
negative consequences that arise from social connections. For example, Hwang and Kim, (2009) 
shows that when board members share social connections with the CEO, the monitoring 
9 
effectiveness of the board is weaker. Similarly, Guan et al., (2016) shows that audit quality is 
compromised when auditors and clients share past educational connections. 
More closely related to this study are studies that explore the role played by social 
connections in the syndicated loan market. For example, Engelberg et al., (2012) shows that 
when banks and borrowers share past educational connections, interest rates and other loan terms 
are considerably reduced. Houston et al., (2017) shows that bank with social connections partner 
together in the syndicated loan market more frequently and that banks in more central positions 
in the network of social connections contribute more to the systemic risk of the system. 
Although the studies described here focus on the existence of an explicit social link 
between top individuals at firms (for example, in Engelberg et al., (2012) the top managers of a 
bank and a borrowing firm either share a past social connection or they do not), a growing stream 
of literature considers the network structure that emerges from the overall set of connections 
between firms or agents. 
2.2 Networks in finance and accounting 
Several studies use networks of connections to compute measures of structural centrality 
that capture the extent to which top individuals at firms are in more influential positions in the 
overall network, and purport that firms with individuals in more influential positions have access 
to better resources and information channels. 2 For example, Larcker et al., (2013) shows that 
firms with more central boards of directors in the network of shared directorates earn superior 
risk-adjusted returns than firms whose boards have more peripheral positions. On the other hand, 
El-Khatib et al., (2015) shows that more central CEOs in the network of social connections use 
                                                 
2 See Freeman, (1978) for a discussion of the notion of structural centrality, and Jackson, (2010) for a comprehensive treatment 
of the literature in network theory. 
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their positions of influence to engage more frequently in empire building and value-decreasing 
M&A activities. 
The literature outlined thus far focuses on the role of social connections between top 
individuals in firms (i.e, directors, CEOs, top executives etc.). However, many important 
decisions are not made at the highest levels of the chain of command, and relevant information 
sharing happens at lower levels in the hierarchy of organizations as well. More importantly, 
while the above literature emphasizes the importance of social connections, for example when 
the top management in two firms share an alma-mater, the literature largely neglects that much 
of the information sharing between organizations occurs from professional connections, rather 
than social connections, such as when the teams of two firms repeatedly collaborate in projects. 
If information sharing occurs between teams of mid-ranked individuals engaged in repeated 
collaborations, then it is possible that more central firms in the network of professional 
collaborations have access to better information channels than firms in more peripheral positions 
in the network. This perspective has received much less research effort. Some notable exceptions 
are Bajo et al., (2016); Chuluun, (2015); Godlewski et al., (2012); Hochberg et al., (2007).  
Hochberg et al., (2007) shows that venture capital firms in more central positions in the network 
of VC collaborations make investments that perform significantly better (higher likelihood of 
exit through IPO or sale to another company) than VC firms in more peripheral positions. 
Godlewski et al., (2012) explores the role of bank lending networks as a measure of their 
experience and reputation in a sample of French syndicated deals. Bajo et al., (2016) and 
Chuluun, (2015) study how the location of the IPO book-underwriter in the network of 
investment banks that collaborate in IPO syndicates affects IPO outcomes. 
11 
I expand the literature that explores the role of networks of professional collaborations by 
focusing on the syndicated loan market, a setting in which repeated collaborations between the 
teams of lending institutions is particularly prominent. Specifically, I study whether the location 
of the lead arranger in the global network of peer syndicate lenders has implications for loan 
characteristics and outcomes. 
Before outlining my motivation and predictions it is useful to provide some institutional 
background on the functioning of the syndicated loan market. 
2.3 Background on the syndicated loan market 
Corporate loans remain the primary source of funds for corporations. Prior to the 1980’s, 
the lending market was dominated by large commercial banks that granted loans and held them 
to maturity. Now, syndicated loans in which a bank, acting as a lead arranger, originates and sells 
off pieces of the loan to other lending institutions, are a sizable portion of the market. 
Syndicated lending typically involves several important stages. 3 First, in a pre-mandate 
stage, a borrower expresses its need from the syndicated loan market and solicits bids from one 
or multiple banks that compete for the mandate. Banks competing for the mandate gather 
information about the purpose of the loan, the credit quality of the borrower, as well as current 
market conditions that may affect the banks ability to offload portions of the loan to other 
lending institutions either during the syndication phase or through the use of the secondary loan 
market after the syndication has been completed. Once all pertinent information has been 
gathered, competing banks submit a bid for the mandate. The bid typically involves both a 
pricing range as well as a syndication strategy. The syndication strategy includes a proposed list 
                                                 
3 see Campbell and Weaver, (2013) for a more comprehensive discussion of the syndicated loan market, its evolution and 
documentation, as well as a detailed discussion of each of the stages involved in the syndication process. 
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of prospective lenders predicted to have an interest in joining the syndicate and acquiring a 
portion of the loan. Once the mandate has been awarded (i.e, when the borrower selects a winner 
among the competing bids), the mandated lead arranger prepares an ‘information memorandum’ 
that contains all pertinent information about the borrower that will be relevant to prospective 
banks and lending institutions. 4 It has become increasingly prevalent that the borrower and the 
lead arranger organize a roadshow in which the borrower meets with prospective lenders and 
presents its forecast and financial performance followed by a Q&A session. After borrower and 
loan information has been disseminated to prospective lenders, a term sheet and formal invitation 
letters are sent out to prospective lenders that can choose to participate in the loan in various 
amounts. Upon the successful signing of the transaction, a member of the syndicate group is 
assigned the ‘agent’ duty. The agent is in charge of coordinating the administration of the 
facility, gathering covenant compliance information and disseminating it to the lender group, 
collecting fees, arranging for covenant waivers and amendments in the event of technical default, 
etc. In addition, the secondary loan market has become increasingly important in the post signing 
phase. The secondary loan market allows lenders to offload portions of their loans to other bank 
and non bank institutional investors should the need to reduce exposure to a specific sector, 
borrower or geography arise (Parlour and Plantin, (2008)). 
2.4 Motivation and predictions 
The syndicated loan market is an ideal setting in which to study information flows 
through networks of professional collaborations. Teams in lending institutions engage in long 
                                                 
4 The information memorandum frequently contains material, non-public information such as cash flow projections, interim 
performance measures, etc. This information memorandum is sent out to an agreed upon list of banks, who must sign 
confidentiality agreements. However, several research papers have raised concerns with information leaking to the market around 
loan originations and amendments, specially when non bank institutions are involved (see, for example, Bushman et al., (2010); 
Ivashina and Sun, (2011); Landsman et al., (2017) and Massoud et al., (2011). 
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term relationships when they jointly fund loans. The structure of syndicate collaborations can be 
thought of as a network in which a lending institution is a node, and two nodes are connected if 
they collaborate in a syndicate. To the extent that syndication networks facilitate information 
sharing, a more central lead arranger in the network of former syndicate collaborations could be 
in a better position to extract information useful in the valuation of debt claims. That is, 
information sharing in the network of former syndicate partners grants central lead arrangers 
access to better information about the credit risk of the borrower and/or market appetite for 
loans. 
There are a number of ways in which valuable information could be moving through 
networks of past syndicate collaborations. For example, employees at connected institutions 
could directly share their knowledge about the quality of the borrower, about the prospects of the 
sector, or about the market appetite for specific loans. In addition, the networks could lower the 
cost of gathering information, for instance, it may take fewer calls, or prospective lenders may be 
more forthcoming with their knowledge and expertise when communicating with a former 
syndicate partner. Networks of past collaborations could make it easier for a lead arranger to 
obtain information about similar deals that have recently taken place and this could be helpful 
because comparable deals are typically a useful pricing benchmark. Moreover, the network can 
assist the arranger in obtaining information about the exposures of prospective banks to specific 
industries, geographies, borrowers, as well as changes in credit policies at such banks, all of 
which facilitate the arranging bank’s ability to predict which set of banks are likely to participate 
in the loan and what price will clear the market. 
Several practitioners have noted that well-connectedness with peer lending institutions is 
key for loan pricing, and that information sharing is a critical reason why this is the case. 
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For example, consistent with syndicating units at lead arranger institutions gathering 
information through their network of peer institutions,  Campbell and Weaver, (2013) pp 260 
notes that: “Enquiries with other banks can thus be undertaken only on the basis of trust between 
the individuals concerned and it is this feature of the market which is perhaps the most important 
for a syndication unit, the establishment of a rapport with competitors which does not breach the 
competitive spirit of the market (any collusion as to pricing being, of course, unacceptable and 
contrary to competition law) and yet provides for a two-way flow of information”. 
Appendix B contains additional examples of practitioners highlighting the importance of 
relationships with peer institutions for the success in the banking business. Several of the 
examples explicitly mention that nurturing a network of contacts and developing relationships of 
trust with peer institutions is fundamental in order to gain access to timely information. 
Motivated by the above assertions, my study seeks to explore the extent to which the well 
connectedness of the lead arranger affects loan characteristics and outcomes. 
A vast number of theoretical studies have explored market failures and financing frictions 
that arise from adverse selection concerns when there is information asymmetry between 
entrepreneurs and financiers (see the seminal work of Akerlof (1970) and Spence, (1973), as well 
as applications to the corporate finance setting such as, Beatty and Ritter (1986); Leland and Pyle 
(1977); Myers and Maljuf (1984); Rock (1986), among others). If more central lead arrangers in 
the network of syndicate collaborations have access to better information channels that are 
valuable in screening borrowers and pricing debt claims, for example, because better information 
is useful in mitigating the adverse selection concerns described in the literature above, then more 
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central arrangers should be willing to accept lower interest terms (holding all else constant). 5 
Moreover, if competition in the lending market leads to some of the information benefits being 
shared with borrowers, then I expect a negative relation between lead arranger centrality and 
interest spread. This leads to my first hypothesis (all hypotheses are stated in alternative form): 
Hypothesis 1: Lead Arrangers with more central positions in the network of syndicate 
collaborations charge a lower loan spread. 
Interest spread is only one of multiple loan terms that are bargained in lending 
agreements. For example, when asset substitution and risk shifting are a concern, lenders may 
seek protection with the use of net worth and financial covenants (Smith and Warner (1979)), or 
by lending in lower amounts, shorter maturities, and by requiring more collateral backing. If 
more central lead arrangers have access to better information channels that are helpful in 
mitigating risk shifting and asset substitution, then I expect that loans granted by more central 
lead arrangers are larger, have longer maturities and have a lower incidence of restrictive 
covenants and collateral requirements than otherwise comparable loans granted by arrangers in 
more peripheral positions in the network. Note that testing whether non-price loan terms respond 
to centrality in the same way loan spread does, helps mitigate concerns that any price 
concessions warranted by more central leads are merely substituting for other, more restrictive 
non-price clauses elsewhere in the loan contract. If those trade-offs do occur, then the net effect 
of lead arranger centrality on loan terms becomes uncertain. This leads to my second hypothesis: 
                                                 
5 The logical framework here parallels that in Petersen and Rajan, (1994) where relationship lenders have access to better 
information, and in Engelberg et al., (2012) where social ties between borrowers and lenders stimulate information flows. 
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Hypothesis 2: Lead Arrangers in more central positions in the network of past syndicate 
collaborations lend in larger amounts, over longer maturities, with lower incidence of restrictive 
covenants and with less frequent collateral requirements. 
To further substantiate my inferences and mitigate the potential for alternative 
explanations as to why more central lead arrangers charge a lower loan spread, I conduct several 
cross sectional tests to determine whether the effect of centrality on spread is stronger in 
instances in which the access to better information channels is likely to be more valuable for lead 
arrangers. First, I expect the information obtained through networks of prior syndicate 
collaborations to be particularly valuable when borrowers are less transparent and harder to 
screen. This leads to my third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The effect of lead arranger centrality on loan spread is more pronounced 
for firms that are less transparent and harder to screen. 
Second, if lead arrangers use their network of past syndicate collaborations to acquire 
information that is valuable in loan pricing, I expect the value of the syndicate network to be 
higher in cases in which the lead arranger is ex-ante less informed about the borrower. This can 
occur when the lead arranger is new to the industry of the borrower, the geography, the lead 
arranger is not a local bank, or when the lead arranger is not a relationship bank. This leads to 
my fourth hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The effect of lead arranger centrality on loan spread is more pronounced 
when the arranger is ex-ante relatively less informed. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Measures of Lead Arranger Centrality 
A key element in my research design requires the computation of lead arranger centrality. 
To do so, I largely follow Bajo et al., (2016) and Hochberg et al., (2007), and consider each 
lending institution as a node in a network, and two lending institutions are connected when they 
collaborate in at least one common loan syndicate in the 5 years prior to a loan initiation. 6 
Because structural centrality is a multi-dimensional construct (see Freeman, (1978) for a 
discussion), I follow El-Khatib et al., (2015); Houston et al., (2017) and Larcker et al., (2013) 
and use three common centrality measures widely used in network theory. The first, Degree, 
simply measures the number of institutions that the focal institution is connected to, the second, 
Betweenness, measures the frequency with which an institution is located in the shortest path 
between other institutions, and the third, Eigenvector, measures the extent to which an institution 
is connected to institutions that are themselves central. 
I describe each in turn with the use of a simple network. 
                                                 
6 Dealscan provides unique identifiers for each lending institution involved in a loan. In addition, Dealscan also provides 
information about each institution’s ultimate parent ‘UltimateParentID’, frequently a bank holding company. Because I consider 
the lending teams in subsidiaries and affiliated lending institutions to be sufficiently separated from those of their parent bank 
holding institutions such that information channels between these teams are more accurately measured at the coarser level, 
throughout my analysis I use the subsidiary identifiers to measure centrality. Plots A, B and C in Figure 1 illustrate the network 
structures that emerge from collaborations in the syndicated loan market during quarters 1988-Q4, 2008-Q4 and 2016-Q4, 
respectively. Note that in Figures 1, 2 and 3, I describe the evolution of the syndicated network using quarterly slices of the data. 
Quarterly slices, by restricting the number of nodes, make the plotting of the networks feasible. However, the tests in the main 
analysis of the paper are based on measures of centrality that use larger networks that span 5 years starting in the year prior to 
each loan initiation date. 
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3.1.1 Degree Centrality 
Degree is the simplest measure of node centrality. The degree of a node in a network is 
simply the count of the number of its adjacent nodes, i.e., the number of distinct relationships a 
lending institution has established with other institutions through its collaboration in prior loan 
syndicates. An institution with relatively more connections has more communication channels 
through its partner institutions, and this likely improves an institutions’ ability to extract and/or 













where xi,j is 1 when institutions i and j collaborate in at least one syndicate, and n is the 
number of nodes in the network. 
In the example provided in figure 1, the un-scaled degree centrality score of node C is 3 
because node C is connected to three other nodes, that is, nodes {B,E,D}. 
3.1.2 Betweenness Centrality 
Betweenness centrality measures the frequency witch which a node is located on the 
shortest path between any other two nodes of the network. Lending institutions that score high on 
Betweenness act as gatekeepers of information because an institution located between two other 
institutions (or clusters of institutions) can either facilitate or impede the information flow 
between institutions. 
Betweenness Centrality is computed as follows: 
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where G(k,j) are all the shortest paths existent between nodes k and j, and Gi(k,j) are all 
the shortest paths between nodes k and j that go through node i. 
In the example provided in figure 1, the un-scaled betweenness centrality score of node F 
is 0.5. Note that node F is only in the shortest paths that connect nodes H and G and we can 
therefore disregard the rest of the nodes. There are a total number of 2 shortest paths from node 
H to node G (i.e., H → A → G and H → F → G), and a total of two shortest paths from node G to 
node H (i.e., G → A → H and G → F → H). Two out of the four shortest paths go through node F, 
and therefore the unscaled betweenness score of node F is 0.5. In addition, it is worth noting that 
while node B scores lower in degree centrality than, for example, node E (node, E has 3 friends 
while node B has only 2), node B has a larger betweenness centrality score than node E. This is 
because node B is more frequently in the shortest path between all nodes (betweenness of B is 
16, whereas betweenness of E is 7). This illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of centrality. 
While node E has more direct contacts and could conceivably extract information from a larger 
number of institutions, node B is a gatekeeper because it lays in between two clusters of 
institutions and it could use its position to facilitate or impede information flows between those 
clusters. 
3.1.3 Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality measures the extent to which a node is connected to many nodes 
that are themselves central. That is, Eigenvector centrality is a variation of Degree centrality that 
weighs each partner node by its importance. Nodes that are connected to many peripheral nodes 
receive a lower score than nodes that are connected to many nodes that are themselves central, 
(see Bonacich, (1972) for computational details). Lending institutions that score high in 
Eigenvector centrality have greater ability to extract and or disseminate information since they 
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have a access to better information channels through their connections to lending institutions that 
are themselves central. Eigenvector Centrality is computed by solving the following: 
 1 ,
1




= Ω∑  (3) 
 where Ωi,j is 1 when institutions i and j collaborate in at least one syndicate and λ 
is the largest eigen-value of the adjacency matrix Ω. An adjacency matrix (or matrix of 
connections) is simply a convenient way of describing a network. A network composed by a set 
of nodes or banks, B = {1,2,··· ,n} and a set of links (or relationships between banks) ω. If a link 
exists between banks i and j, we indicate it as (i,j) ∈ ω . The adjacency matrix is the n × n matrix 
Ω = [Ωij] whose element Ωij 6= 0 whenever (i,j) ∈ ω. The network is un-directed if links are such 
that Ω = ΩT, meaning that if bank A is connected to bank B, then bank B is also connected to 
Bank 
A. A network is un-weighted if Ωi,j ∈ {0,1}, meaning that connections are binary, banks 
are either connected or they are not, but there is no weight assigned to the strength of the 
relationship. In the example provided in figure 1, it is worth noting that while node F and node E 
both have a score of 3 in degree centrality, the eigenvector centrality of node F is higher than that 
of node E (eigen of node F = 0.87, eigen of node E = 0.24). This occurs because despite having 
the same number of friends, the friends of node F are themselves more popular than those of 
node E. 
3.1.4 NScore 
Because as shown above, each of the three centrality measures described reflects 
different dimensions of centrality, following El-Khatib et al., (2015) and Larcker et al., (2013), I 
also create a composite measure of centrality, NScore, which is the average of the scaled ranks of 
each of the three measures. I rank banks in every calendar year by each of the centrality scores 
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and assign the bank a rank value (i.e., the least central bank is assigned a 1, the second least 
central bank is assigned a 2, and so forth). I then divide the centrality rank by the number of 
distinct banks in each year in my sample. The rank transformation preserves the rank order of 
centrality scores and simplifies the interpretation of coefficients. NScore will be the primary 
centrality measure that I used throughout my analysis and when discussing results. Results are 
generally the same when using the normalized raw scores of each of the centrality measures, but 
NScore, by averaging accross the various dimensions of centrality, likely reduces noise when 
measuring the construct of interest. I compute NScore as follows: 
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Using the example provided in figure 1 as the network for a given year in my sample, 
degrank, eigenrank and betwrank are the scaled ranked values of degree, betweenness and 
eigenvector centrality respectively. Taking the average and multiplying by 10, we get NScores 
with values ∈ (0,10]. 
3.2 Testing for the effect of lead arranger centrality on loan interest spread 
I generally base my research design in that of Bajo et al., (2016) and Chuluun,( 2015). I 
test for the effect of Centrality on Spread by estimating the following equation by OLS: 
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Each observation in the analysis corresponds to one loan (facility). 7 The dependent 
variable, Spread, is the interest margin over the LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate) for 
each loan. Centrality is each of the measures of lead arranger centrality described in section 3.1. 
β1 reflects the change in spread for a one unit increase in the measure of lead arranger centrality. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts β1 is negative, which is consistent with more central lead arrangers with 
access to better information channels accepting lower loan spreads than arrangers in more 
peripheral positions in the network. 
Equation 3.5 includes a set of control variables for a variety of firm- and loan-specific 
characteristics that prior research identifies as affecting loan spread. Firms whose loans are 
arranged by more central lead arrangers could possess observable (and unobservable) 
characteristics that, while unrelated to the hypothesized mechanism by which more central lead 
arrangers can access better information channels, make them more attractive to more central lead 
arrangers and simultaneously affect interest spread. For example, it is possible that loans 
arranged by more central lead arrangers are larger and riskier. Inclusion of observable firm- and 
loan-specific characteristics that are correlated with loan spread and plausibly correlated with 
Centrality helps mitigate the potential for coefficient bias for the explanatory variable of interest, 
Centrality. 
The firm characteristics are the ratio of long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets, Leverage; firm size as measured by the natural logarithm of total assets, 
AtLog; the ratio of property plant and equipment plus inventory divided by total assets, 
Tangibility; return on assets, Roa; an indicator variable for firms with negative income before 
extraordinary items, Dloss; the ratio of capx to total assets, Capx Intens; the Altman Z-score, 
                                                 
7 I repeat my analysis at the package/deal level and results remain generally the same. 
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AltmanZ 8; an indicator variable for firms with an S&P long-term rating greater than or equal to 
BBB-, InvG. In addition to time varying firm characteristics, I estimate eq. 3.5 using either 
industry fixed effects or firm fixed effects. Including industry (firm) fixed effects, controls for 
unobservable industry (firm) characteristics that are constant over time, Industry FE (Firm FE). 
All firm-level variables are measured as of the most recent annual financial reporting date prior 
to the loan origination. 
I include loan characteristics that prior research identifies as being related to loan spread 
(see, for example Amiram et al., (2017); Nandy and Shao, (2007) and Shan et al., (2016)).  
The loan characteristics I include in equation 3.5 are the natural log of the loan dollar 
amount, LoanAmtLog; the natural log of the loan term in months, MatLog; an indicator variable 
that equals one if the loan has a performance pricing provision, DPerfpricing; the natural log of 
then number of distinct lenders, Nlenders; an indicator variable that equals one if a loan is 
secured, DSecured; an indicator variable that equals one if a loan has covenants, DCovenants; a 
set of 37 indicator variables for loan purpose, e.g., whether a loan is used to finance an 
acquisition or whether a loan is used to execute a leveraged buyout; an indicator variable for 
whether a loan is a Term Loan B loan and below, DTermB 9; an indicator variable of whether the 
loan is a Revolver/Line of credit, DRevolver; an indicator variable that takes value one if the 
parent bank holding company that arranges the loan is classified by dealscan as either “Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch”, “JP Morgan” or “City” or any of its predecessors (based on Ross, 
                                                 
8 Following Altman, (1968) I calculate Altman Z-score using the following equation: (1.2 ∗ (act − lct)/at) + (1.4 ∗ re/at) + (3.3 ∗ 
(ni + xint + txt)/at) + (0.6 ∗ csho ∗ prcc/lt) + (0.999 ∗ sale/at). 
9 Landsman et al., (2017); Lim et al., (2014); Nandy and Shao, (2007)  show that loans involving non-bank institutions charge an 
incremental spread relative to loans involving bank only lenders. Because non-bank institutions typically participate in Term 
loans B and bellow, the inclusion of DTermB helps control for the effect of non-bank institutional participation on spreads. 
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(2010)), BH Reputation 10; an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the lead arranger has 
arranged at least one other loan by the same borrower in the previous 5 years , Relationship. 
Equation 3.5 also includes year fixed effects, Year FE to control for common 
macroeconomic factors that explain Spread; as well as an indicator variable for loans involving 
multiple lending institutions with a lead role in the syndicate, Multi Lead, to control for 
systematic differences in loans with multiple lead arrangers). 11 All indicator variables take on 
the value of zero otherwise. Appendix A provides definitions of all variables used in equation 3.5 
and following equations and details on how the variables are constructed. 
3.3 Sensitivity analysis of the effect of centrality on loan spread and omitted correlated 
variables 
Although, as described in section 3.2, I attempt to reduce omitted variable bias by 
including several firm-, loan- and bank- level control variables, my design does not include an 
instrument capable of identifying a causal relation. I further address the potential for omitted 
variable bias in several ways. First, I estimate a modified version of equation 3.5 in which I 
include lead arranger fixed effects to create a within-lead arranger research design. Lead arranger 
fixed effects control for all lead arranger level time invariant observable and un-observable 
characteristics that explain Spread and are correlated with centrality. 
Multivariate matching techniques are a second approach frequently used in finance and 
accounting research to address omitted variable bias (see Roberts and Whited, (2013) for a 
                                                 
10 I repeat my analysis using variations of the control for lead arranger reputation, measured both at the parent Bank Holding 
Level as well as at the coarser Lead Arranger level. In all variations, inferences remain unchanged. Specifically, I replace BH 
Reputation with the market share of the bank holding company (BH MktShare) and with an indicator variable that equals one if 
the Market Share of the Lead Arranger is greater than 2% in the year prior to the loan origination, based on Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman, (2012) (LA Reputation). I report the results of these variations in table 5. In addition, in untabulated 
analysis, I use the linking table provided by Schwert, (2018) to link in financial information of the largest lead bank holding 
companies in DealScan, for a sub sample that spans until 2012. I use the log of total assets of the lead Bank Holding company as 
a control variable for reputation and again, inferences remain unchanged. 
11 Findings in which I drop loans with multiple arrangers yield similar inferences. 
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discussion). While propensity score matching is the main form of multivariate matching used in 
accounting research, several recent studies indicate that propensity score matching often 
exacerbates differences between the individual variables used in the first stage of the propensity 
score estimation (e.g., Imbens and Rubin, (2015); King and Nielsen, (2016)). On the other hand, 
entropy balancing uses continuous weights that exactly account for inequalities in the first, 
second, and possibly higher moments of the co-variate distributions (Hainmueller, (2012)). My 
use of entropy balancing is complicated by the fact that my treatment variables are not binary. 
Despite this limitation, I seek to provide additional evidence of the robustness of my inferences. 
Thus, I create an indicator variable, Hi Centrality that takes the value of one if Centrality is 
above the sample median in a given year. I then include all the independent variables from 
Equation 3.5, with the exception of Centrality, as variables in the first-stage that estimates 
continuous weights to achieve covariate balance. 
In addition, to mitigate the possibility that the effect of Centrality on Spread is driven by 
a few number of extremely large bank holding companies, or by syndicates involving multiple 
lead arrangers, both of which could be systematically different to the rest of the sample, I re-
estimate equation 3.5 for sub-samples that a) exclude loans issued by the top 3 bank holding 
companies (based on Ross, (2010)), and b) exclude loans with syndicates that involve multiple 
banks in lead roles. 
3.4 The effect of centrality on other non-price loan terms 
I test for the effect of Centrality on other non-price loan terms using modified versions of 
equation 3.5. Specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
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Loan Feature is equal to either a) the natural logarithm of the loan amount in million 
USD, LoanAmtLog; b) the natural logarithm of the loan maturity in months, Matlog; c) an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the loan has a financial or a net-worth covenant, 
DCovenants; and d) an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the loan is secured by 
collateral, DSecured. All control variables remain the same as those described in the section 3.2 
for spread specifications, with the exception that in each case the dependent variable is excluded 
from the controls (i.e, LoanAmtLog can not be a control when LoanAmtLog is the dependent 
variable). 
Hypothesis 2 predicts β1 is positive in specifications in which LoanAmtLog or MatLog is 
the dependent variable, and negative in specifications in which DCovenants or DSecured is the 
dependent variable. These predictions are consistent with more central lead arrangers having 
access to better information channels that are helpful in mitigating the risks associated with debt 
contracting, and at least some of these information benefits being shared with borrowers both in 
the forms of lower spread, as well as with better non-price loan terms. Moreover, showing that 
non-price loan terms such as LoanAmtLog, MatLog, DCovenants and DSecured, respond to 
centrality in the same way Spread does, helps mitigate concerns that any price concessions 
warranted by more central leads are merely substituting for other, more restrictive non-price 
clauses elsewhere in the loan contract (see Amiram et al., (2017)). If those trade-offs do occur, 
then the net effect of lead arranger centrality on loan terms becomes uncertain. 
3.5 Cross sectional tests - is lead centrality more valuable when borrowers are less 
transparent and harder to screen? 
To test the prediction that the information obtained through networks of former syndicate 
collaborations is particularly valuable when borrowers are harder to screen and lack alternative 
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sources of readily available information, I re-estimate equation 3.5 for sub-samples based on 
borrower transparency. I consider multiple measures for borrower transparency. The first 
measure, Low Numest, is based on prior studies that find evidence that analyst produce useful 
information for debt capital providers (see, for example, (Güntay and Hackbarth, (2010) and 
Mansi et al., (2011). Low Numest is an indicator variable that equals one when the number of 
analyst that follow the borrower in the year prior to the loan origination is below the sample 
median. The second measure, No Rated, is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when 
the firm’s debt does not have an S&P long term rating in the year prior to loan origination. The 
third, fourth, and fifth measures: Has Rd, Hi Tech and Big5 are based on prior studies that 
purport that borrowers with high R&D or in high tech industries are harder to screen (see 
Chuluun, (2015) and Sufi, (2007)) as well as studies that show that audit quality and accounting 
quality are priced by lenders (see, for example, Bharath et al., (2008); Chen et al., (2016); 
Graham et al., (2008); Longstaff et al., (2005); Minnis, (2011), among others). Has Rd is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm reports positive R&D expenses in the 
year prior to loan origination. Hi Tech, is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the 
firm is in a high tech two digit SIC code (I use the classification of high tech industries in 
Chuluun, (2015)). I measure audit quality using, Big5, which is an indicator variable that takes a 
value of one when the borrowing firm is audited by a Big5 auditor in the year prior to the loan 
origination. In each case, with the exception of Big5, the indicator variables take a value of one 
when the borrower is considered as having relatively low transparency, and zero otherwise. I test 
for cross sample differences in the coefficient of interest, Centrality. Hypothesis 3 predicts that 
the coefficient β1_low_transparency_sample > β1_high_transparency_sample. 
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3.6 Cross sectional test: is lead centrality more valuable when the lead is ex-ante 
relatively less informed? 
To test the prediction that the information obtained through networks of past syndicate 
collaborations is particularly valuable when the lead is ex-ante relatively less informed about the 
borrower, the industry, or the geography, I re-estimate equation 3.5 for sub-samples based on the 
lead arrangers prior experience. I consider multiple indicator variables of a leads relative 
inexperience. The first, No Relationship, is based on studies that purport that relationship banks 
have access to proprietary information about the borrowers (see (Petersen and Rajan, (1994) and 
Rajan, (1992)). I measure No Relationship as an indicator variable that equals one when the lead 
is not a relationship bank, i.e, the lead bank has not arranged a loan for the same borrower in the 
past 5 years. The second measure, New Industry, is based on studies that show that industry peer 
information is valuable for lenders (see, (Shroff et al., 2016)). I measure a leads access to peer 
information as New Industry, which is an indicator variable that equals one when the lead has not 
arranged a loan in the same two digit SIC code in the past 5 years. The third and fourth, New 
Geography and Non Local, are based on the literature that finds that physical distance between 
lenders and borrowers is an important factor in the lenders ability to acquire soft information 
(see, Petersen and Rajan, (1994) and Stein, (2002)). I measure New Geography as an indicator 
variable that equals one when the lead has not arranged a loan in the same state in the past 5 
years. I measure Non Local as an indicator variable that equals one when the bank and the 
borrower are in different states. In each case, the indicator variable takes a value of one when the 
lead arranger is considered to be ex-ante relatively less informed, and zero otherwise. I test for 
cross sample differences in the coefficient of interest, Centrality. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the 
coefficient β1_inexperience-sample > β1_experience-sample. 
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CHAPTER 4: SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1 Sample Selection 
I begin by obtaining all available loan pricing and contract data from DealScan, as well as 
information on the composition of each loan syndicate (lender names, lender identifiers, lender 
roles, etc.). The starting sample consists of approximately 345 thousand loans (or facilities), 237 
thousand deals, with approximately 20 thousand distinct lenders and 88 thousand distinct 
borrowers. I compute measures of lead arranger centrality using this initial sample, which 
involves approximately 1.9 million loan-lender combinations. See section 3.1 for details on the 
construction of lead centrality measures. There is no straightforward way of identifying the lead 
arranger in a loan in cases in which more than one institution has a lead role in the syndicate. I 
perform sequential filters to identify the lead arranger (largely based in Amiram et al., (2017); 
Sufi, (2007) and institutional details on the common terminology used to describe syndicate 
members from Campbell and Weaver, (2013)).12 Borrower accounting information used as 
control variables and in cross sectional tests are obtained from Compustat North America. I 
                                                 
12 To identify lead arrangers, I first require that loans in my sample have at least one lender in a lead role, that is, at least one 
lender in the facility must be flagged by Dealscan as with either “Lead Arranger Credit” marked as “Yes”, or “Agent Credit” 
marked as “Yes”, or acting as either: Bookrunner, Agent, Arranger, Coordinating arranger, Lead arranger, Lead bank, Lead 
manager, Mandated Lead Arranger, Mandated arranger, Admin agent. If there is only one institution acting as “Mandated Lead 
Arranger”, “Mandated Arranger” or “Bookrunner” then I keep this and delete all others. If duplicates still remain then keep only 
institutions with “Lead Arranger Credit” marked as “Yes” and delete all others. If duplicates still remain then keep only 
institutions with ”Agent Credit” equal to ”Yes” and delete all others. If duplicates still remain and the ”bankallocation” variable 
is not missing in Dealscan, then keep the institution in a lead role that kept the largest fraction of the loan. If duplicates still 
remain then keep the institution that had a lead role in the largest number of distinct facilities in the year prior to origination. If 
duplicates still remain then keep the institution with a bank holding company that is most active in the syndicated loan market in 
the overall sample. It is worth noting that throughout my analysis I include a control variable Multi Lead in all specifications. 
Multi Lead is an indicator variable that takes a value of one when the syndicate contains more than one lending institution with a 
lead role in the syndicate. This mitigates concerns that loans with multiple leads are systematically different to loans with only 
one lead. In addition, I repeat my analysis using loans with only one lead arranger and results remain largely the same. Moreover, 
miss-classification of lead arrangers likely introduces noise in my measure of lead centrality which should bias regression 
coefficients in favor of the null. 
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merge Compustat and DealScan using the updated linking table provided by Chava and Roberts 
through WRDS (Chava and Roberts, (2008)). To be included in the sample, each loan facility 
observation must have non-missing data from DealScan and Compustat used to construct the 
primary variables in my analysis for the period 1987 to 2016. Table 2 provides details on the 
filters applied resulting in the final sample of 41,477 loans (facilities), 28,700 deals (packages) 
granted to 8,726 distinct borrowers. 
4.2 Description of the evolution of the global network of loan collaborations 
Figure 2 provides a description of the evolution of the global network of syndicate 
collaborations from 1987 to 2016. Figure 2 plots the quarterly networks that emerge from 
collaborations in loan syndicates. Each node is a lending institution and two nodes are linked 
when they participate in the same syndicate in the quarter. The size of the nodes depicted is 
proportional to their degree centrality (the number of distinct nodes that connect to the focal 
node within the quarter). The color of the nodes are based on their modularity class, an estimate 
of the extent to which nodes in the network are highly connected within a cluster but are sparsely 
connected with other clusters. Focusing on the 2008Q4 depicted in panel B of Figure 2, it is 
evident that geographic clusters emerge. The green section on the top of the plot contains mainly 
North American lending institutions (where banks such as Bank of America and JP Morgan 
show up as some of the most central players in the cluster). The black section in the bottom of 
the plot is mostly comprised by South American institutions, with the two largest Spanish banks 
Banco Santander and BBVA acting as gatekeepers and linking the South American cluster 
(black) with the European cluster (pink). 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the number of distinct lending institutions that participate 
in the syndicated loan market. It is worth noting that throughout the entire sample, the number of 
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isolated lenders, that is, lenders that are not part of the fully connected component of the 
network, is very small (dark blue portion). It appears that a structural shift occurred in the mid 
1990’s, with the number of distinct lending institutions growing considerably (below 500 prior to 
1990 but averaging around 1500 since the mid 1990’s). This can be explained by the fact that 
prior to the mid 1990’s, loan syndicates were comprised mainly of bank-only lenders. In the mid-
1990s, non-bank institutional lenders, such as hedge funds, mutual funds, and finance 
companies, increased their participation in loan syndicates, largely because the introduction of 
loan ratings by rating agencies facilitated the syndication process and allowed for portfolio 
strategies to be applied to the valuation of the loan asset class (Campbell and Weaver, (2013); 
Nandy and Shao, (2007)). Also worth noting is the sharp drop in lending institutions and 
subsequent recovery during the global financial crisis around 2008. 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of quarterly network descriptives with time. Panel A shows the 
evolution of network density. Density captures the proportion of potential connections that 
actually exist. It appears that density has dropped considerably between 1987 and the mid 
1990’s. While in the early years of my sample more than 30% of possible connections actually 
existed, the number has dropped to around 2% in the most recent quarters. Panel B shows that 
the average shortest distance between any two lending institutions has increased from around 1.7 
in 1987 to around 2.7 in latter years, suggesting that institutions are on average, more distant 
from each other than what they used to be in the late 1980’s. Panel C) yields a similar 
conclusion, the diameter of the giant component of the network (defined as the maximum 
shortest path between two nodes in the largest fully connected component of the network, i.e., 
the maximum smallest distance between nodes), has increased considerably from around 3 in 
1987 to around 9 in the late 2010’s. 
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4.3 Descriptive Statistics: primary variables in my analysis 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the sample of 41,447 loans originated between 
1987 and 2016 with non-missing information on the variables used for my primary analysis. 
Panel A presents summary statistics for loan-, firm- and bank- variables relating to all loans in 
my analysis. The average loan spread is 222.8 bps with a standard deviation of 148.4 bps. The 
average leverage ratio is 0.308, 43% of the observations have a credit rating, and 19.5% of the 25 
observations have investment grade ratings (BBB- or above). 34% of the observations are 
arranged by relationship lead arrangers, and around 8% of the loans are Term B and bellow, 
while around 70% are Revolvers. The average lead arranger in my sample is connected to 19.2% 
of all the institutions in the trailing 5-year network, with a standard deviation of 13.1%.
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 The effect of lead centrality on loan spread 
Table (4) presents results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of lead centrality on 
loan spread, i.e., the estimation of equation 3.5. The dependent variable in columns (1) through 
(5) is Spread, the interest margin over the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) for each 
loan. The main explanatory variable of interest is Centrality. Centrality is measured by Degree in 
column (1), by Eigenvector in column (2), by Betweenness in column (3), and by the composite 
measure, NScore, in columns (4) and (5). All specifications include firm-, loan-, and bank- level 
control variables, as well as industry, loan purpose, year, and Multi Lead arranger fixed effects, 
with the exception of column 
(5), in which industry fixed effects are replaced by firm fixed effects. 13 The key finding 
in the table (4) regarding hypothesis 1 is that the coefficient on Centrality, β1, is significantly 
negative in all five estimations, with t-statistics ranging from -4.25 to -14.18. 14. In terms of 
economic magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in NScore (2.44, see table 3) is 
associated with between an 11 bps (2.44 × 4.59) and a 13 bps (2.44 × 5.32) decrease in loan 
spread. This effect is roughly equivalent to that of including a loan covenant in my sample. This 
                                                 
13 For the sake of parsimony I do not tabulate the constant and fixed effects coefficients. Also, while I tabulate the results for the 
raw centrality scores in columns (1), (2) and (3) of this table, in subsequent tables I will only discuss the results for the aggregate 
measure NScore. 
14 Throughout, I include *, **, *** next to regression coefficients to indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
corresponding to a two-sided alternative. However, when discussing regression findings relating to coefficients for which I have 
signed predictions, e.g., the coefficient on Centrality, I use a five percent significance level under a one-sided alternative. 
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finding is consistent with lead arrangers in more central positions in the network being able to 
offer lower loan spreads than lead arrangers with more peripheral positions in the network. 
5.2 Robustness of the effect of lead centrality on loan spread 
Table (5) presents regression summary statistics for a battery of plausible variations of 
equation 3.5. All specifications in both panel A and panel B include firm-, loan- and bank- level 
control variables as well as Loan Purpose, Multi Lead, Year and Industry fixed effects except 
when otherwise noted below. 15 
Panel A Columns (1) and (2) present findings corresponding to versions of equation (3.5) 
in which I use alternative measures of the reputation of the lead bank holding company. 
Specifically, in column (1), I replace BH Reputation which is an indicator variable that equals 
one if the lead bank holding company is either Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan or 
Citi, or any of their predecessors, based on (Ross, 2010), and include instead the variable BH 
MktShare, which is the market share of the lead bank holding company computed in the year 
before the loan origination. The estimated coefficient β1, on Centrality, remains negative and 
significant (coefficient = -5.42, t-statistic = -9.72). In column (2), I replace BH Reputation with 
an indicator variable LA Reputation which takes a value of one when the lead arranger has a 
market share greater than 2% in the year prior to the loan origination, based on Bushman and 
Wittenberg-Moerman, (2012)). The coefficient β1, on Centrality, remains negative and 
significant (coefficient = -6.33, t-statistic = -9.36). In addition, in untabulated analysis, I use the 
linking table provided by Schwert (2018) to add financial information of the largest lead bank 
holding companies by participation in DealScan. The linking table contains information for a sub 
                                                 
15 For the sake of parsimony, in this table as well as in subsequent ones, I do not tabulate coefficients on control variables, as well 
as constant and fixed effects. 
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sample that spans until 2012. I re estimate equation 3.5 but using the natural log of total assets of 
the lead Bank Holding company, as an alternative control variable for lead arranger reputation 
and again, the coefficient on Centrality remains significantly negative. 
To mitigate the possibility that results are driven by loans with multiple banks in lead 
roles in the syndicate, Panel A, column (3) estimates equation (3.5) but dropping observations in 
which Multi Lead is equal to one. Consistent with measurement error being introduced in 
Centrality in syndicates with multiple institutions acting in lead roles (because of miss-
classification of lead banks), the coefficient on Centrality increases in magnitude and 
significance for the sub-sample of loans with only one lead bank (coefficient = -7.05, t-statistic = 
-11.38)To mitigate the possibility that results are driven by a small number of very large bank 
holding companies, in column (5), I remove all loans arranged by the largest three bank holding 
companies (i.e, keep only observations where BH Reputation equals 0). The coefficient on 
Centrality remains negative and significant (coefficient = -5.88, t-statistic = -10.31). To help 
reduce concerns of omitted correlated variables at the lead arranger level biasing the explanatory 
variable of interest, Panel B, column (1) estimates a variation of equation 3.5 that includes lead 
arranger fixed effects, thus creating a within lead arranger design. The identifying assumption 
here is that any unobservable bank level confounders are constant over time. The coefficient on 
Centrality remains negative and significant (coefficient = -3.83, t-statistic = -4.92). 
Despite the fact that my treatment variable of interest is not dichotomous, in column (2) 
of Panel 
B, I report the results of a variation of equation 3.5 in which I replace Centrality with an 
indicator variable, Hi Centrality, that is equal to one when the lead arrangers’ Centrality is 
greater than the sample median by year. In column (3), I report results for a weighted 
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specification that uses Entropy weights (based on (Hainmueller, 2012)), to achieve co-variate 
balance between High Centrality observations and Low Centrality observations in all covariates 
in equation 3.5. The coefficients on Hi Centrality remain negative and significant (coefficient = -
9.68, t-statistic = -4.88 in column (2) and coefficient = -8.31, t-statistic = -4.51 in column(3)). 
Finally, column (4) in Panel B presents results from estimating a modified version of 
equation 3.5 only for the sub-sample of observations with a non-missing long term credit rating. 
In addition, the estimation in column (4) includes a more demanding fixed effects structure than 
previous specifications. Specifically, I include Industry × Rating × Year fixed effects, creating a 
within Industry-Year-Rating research design. The coefficient of interest, Centrality, is identified 
by variation in Centrality for borrowers in the same industry, the same year and the same credit 
rating. The coefficient on Centrality, albeit smaller, remains negative and significant (coefficient 
= -3.21, t-statistic=3.44). 
Overall, the combined evidence in tables 4 and 5 suggests that lead arrangers in more 
central positions in the network of past syndicate collaborations are able to offer lower loan 
spreads than arrangers in more peripheral positions. This findings are consistent with the well-
connectedness of the lead arranger being an important factor in the pricing of debt claims, and in 
support of hypothesis 1, as well as the emphasis placed by practitioners when describing 
relationships between banks as fundamental for the success in the syndication business. 
5.3 The effect of lead centrality on other, non-price loan terms 
Table (6) presents regression summary statistics for the estimation of equation 3.6, 
investigating the effect of lead centrality on non-price loan terms (Hypothesis 2). All 
specifications contain the same set of firm- loan- and bank- control variables as in previous 
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specifications (i.e, the same controls as those in table 4), with the exception of the control 
variable that corresponds to the dependent variable used in each case. 
Panel A columns (1) and (2) correspond to specifications that investigate the effect of 
lead centrality on loan size, LoanAmtLog. Column (1) includes industry fixed effects, whereas 
column (2) includes firm fixed effects. The key finding in columns (1) and (2) regarding 
hypothesis 2 is that the coefficient on Centrality is positive and significant in both specifications 
(coefficient = 0.033, t-statistic=10.61 in column (1), and coefficient = 0.027, t-statistic=8.07 in 
column (2)). This findings suggest that arrangers in a more central position in the network of past 
syndicate collaborations loan in larger amounts than arrangers in more peripheral positions. In 
terms of economic magnitude, a one unit increase in NScore is associated with between a 3.3% 
and a 2.7% increase in the loan size. 
Panel A columns (3) and (4) correspond to specifications that investigate the effect of 
lead centrality on loan maturity, MatLog. Column (3) includes industry fixed effects, whereas 
column (4) includes firm fixed effects. The key finding in columns (3) and (4) regarding 
hypothesis 2 is that the coefficient on Centrality is positive and significant in both specifications 
(coefficient = 0.016, t-statistic=8.25 in column (3), and coefficient = 0.01 t-statistic = 4.46 in 
column (4)). This suggests that holding other covariates constant, more central leads are able to 
grant loans with larger maturities than peripheral leads. In terms of economic magnitude, a one 
unit increase in Centrality is associated with between a 1% and a 1.7% increase in the loan 
maturity. 
Panel B columns (1) and (2) correspond to specifications that investigate the effect of 
lead centrality on the probability that the loan contains a financial or net worth covenant, 
DCovenant. Column (1) includes industry fixed effects, whereas column (2) includes firm fixed 
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effects. The key finding in columns (1) and (2) regarding hypothesis 2 is that the coefficient on 
Centrality is negative and significant in both specifications (coefficient = -0.006, t-statistic=-4.53 
in column (3), and coefficient = -0.006, t-statistic=-3.97 in column (4)). This findings suggest 
that arrangers in a more central position in the network of past syndicate collaborations loan with 
fewer covenants than arrangers in more peripheral positions. In terms of economic magnitude, a 
one unit increase in NScore is associated with a 0.6% decrease in the probability of the loan 
containing a Covenant. Untabulated findings show that using HI CENT, an indicator variable that 
takes a value of one when NScore is above the mean in every year, leads to a 3.1% reduction in 
the probability of the loan having a covenant (t-statistic = -5.28). 
Panel B columns (3) and (4) correspond to specifications that investigate the effect of 
lead centrality on the probability that the loan is secured, DSecured. Column (3) includes 
industry fixed effects, whereas column (4) includes firm fixed effects. The key finding in 
columns (3) and (4) regarding hypothesis 2 is that the coefficient on Centrality is negative and 
significant in both specifications (coefficient = -0.011, t-statistic=-8.67 in column (3), and 
coefficient = -0.008, t-statistic=-5.07 in column (4)). This findings suggest that arrangers in a 
more central position in the network of past syndicate collaborations loan with fewer incidence 
of collateral requirements than arrangers in more peripheral positions. In terms of economic 
magnitude, a one unit increase in NScore is associated with between a 1.1% and a 0.8% decrease 
in the probability that the loan is secured. 
Overall, the evidence in table 3.6 suggests that lead arrangers in more central positions in 
the network of past syndicate collaborations are able to offer better non-price terms than 
arrangers in more peripheral positions in the network. This findings are consistent with the well-
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connectednesss of the lead arranger being an important factor, not only for the pricing of debt 
claims, and in support of hypothesis 1, but also for non-price loan terms. 
5.4 The effect of lead centrality on spread - conditional on borrower transparency 
In this subsection, I present results from cross-sectional tests to determine if the effect of 
lead centrality on spread varies when the borrower is relatively less transparent and is harder to 
screen. Hypothesis 3 predicts that the value of lead centrality increases when the borrower is 
opaque. I use five measures of borrower transparency and, in each case, table 7 reports summary 
statistics for the estimation of equation 3.5 for the sub-samples of transparent and opaque 
borrowers, respectively. 
Panel A Columns (1) and (2) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on the variable 
Lo Numest. The key finding in columns (1) and (2) is that the coefficient on Centrality is 
significantly higher in the opaque sub-sample with a low number of analyst following 
(coefficient = -3.29 in the high analyst sub-sample versus coefficient=-6.02 for the low analyst 
sub-sample, with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference in coefficients = 15.83, p-
value = 0.000) 
Panel A Columns (3) and (4) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
borrowing firm has a long term rating in the year prior to the loan origination. Firms without a 
credit rating are considered opaque. The key finding in columns (3) and (4) is that the coefficient 
on Centrality is significantly higher in the opaque sub-sample without a credit rating (coefficient 
= -3.06 in the rated sub-sample versus coefficient=-6.14 in the non-rated , with a 2χ  statistic for a 
test of sub-sample difference in coefficients = 15.24, p-value =0.000) 
Panel B Columns (1) and (2) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
borrowing firm is in a high tech industry. Firms in high-tech industries are considered harder to 
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screen and with lower accounting quality. The key finding in columns (1) and (2) is that, despite 
the fact that only 5310 observations remain in the high tech sub-sample, the coefficient on 
Centrality is significantly more negative in the high-tech sub-sample (coefficient = -5 in the non 
high-tech sub-sample versus coefficient=-6.91 in the high-tech sub-sample , with a 2χ  statistic 
for a test of sub-sample difference in coefficients = 3.5, p-value =0.061). 
Panel B Columns (3) and (4) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
borrowing firm is an R&D firm. Firms with zero or missing R&D expenses are consider 
transparent, whereas firms with positive R&D expenses are considered relatively more opaque. 
The key finding in columns (3) and (4) is that the coefficient on Centrality is significantly more 
negative in the R&D sub-sample (coefficient = -3.95 in the non R&D sub-sample versus 
coefficient=-7.47 in the R&D sub-sample , with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference 
in coefficients = 21.382, p-value =0.000). 
Panel C Columns (1) and (2) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
borrowing firm is audited by a Big5 audit firm in the year prior to the loan origination. Firms 
with BIG5 auditors are considered more transparent and therefore require lower screening effort. 
The key finding in columns (1) and (2) is that, despite the fact that only 5694 observations are in 
the non-BIG5 sub-sample, the coefficient on Centrality is significantly more negative in the non-
BIG5 sub-sample (coefficient = -4.87 versus coefficient=-6.9, with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-
sample difference in coefficients = 4.04, p-value =0.044). 
Overall, the evidence in table 7 suggests that the value of lead centrality is particularly 
high for firms that are less transparent and harder to screen, in support of hypothesis H3. 
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5.5  The effect of lead centrality on spread - conditional on measures of lead arranger 
prior expertise 
In this subsection, I present results from cross-sectional tests to determine if the effect of 
lead centrality on spread varies when the lead arranger lacks geographic, industry or borrower 
expertise. Hypothesis 4 predicts that the value of a lead arrangers network increases when the 
lead arranger lacks prior industry, geography or borrower specific expertise. 
I use four measures of lead arranger expertise and, in each case, table 8 reports summary 
statistics for the estimation of equation 3.5 for the sub-samples of relatively high vs low lead 
arranger expertise. 
Panel A Columns (1) and (2) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
lead arranger is a relationship bank. The key finding in columns (1) and (2) is that the coefficient 
on Centrality is significantly more negative for the sub-sample of non-Relationship arrangers 
(coefficient = -3.07 in the Relationship sub-sample versus coefficient = -5.94 in the non-
Relationship sub-sample , with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference in coefficients = 
11.49, p-value =0.001). 
Panel A Columns (3) and (4) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
lead arranger has arranged at least one other loan in the same two digit sic code in the 5 years 
prior to the loan origination. The value of the information channels provided by the network of 
former syndicate collaborations is expected to be higher if the lead arranger is new to the 
industry. The key finding in columns (3) and (4) is that the coefficient on Centrality is 
significantly higher for the sub sample of loans issued by lead arrangers that are new to the 
Industry (coefficient = -4.6 in the Not New to Industry sub-sample versus coefficient=-7.96 in 
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the New to industry sub-sample, with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference in 
coefficients = 15.69, p-value =0.000) 
Panel B Columns (1) and (2) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
lead arranger has arranged at least one other loan in the same state in the 5 years prior to the loan 
origination. The value of the information channels provided by the network of former syndicate 
collaborations is expected to be higher if the lead arranger is new to the geography of the 
borrower. The key finding in columns (3) and (4) is that the coefficient on Centrality is 
significantly higher for the sub sample of loans issued by lead arrangers that are new to the 
geography (coefficient = -4.00 in the Not New to geography sub-sample versus coefficient=-7.96 
in the New to industry sub-sample, with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference in 
coefficients = 20.80, p-value =0.000) 
Panel B Columns (3) and (4) correspond to sub-sample estimations based on whether the 
borrower is located in the same state as the lead arranger. The value of the information channels 
provided by the network of former syndicate collaborations is expected to be higher if the lead 
arranger is located in a different state. The key finding in columns (3) and (4) is that the 
coefficient on Centrality is significantly more negative in the out of state sub-sample (coefficient 
= -3.87 in the same state sub-sample versus coefficient=-7.45 in the out of state sub-sample , 
with a 2χ  statistic for a test of sub-sample difference in coefficients = 12.77, p-value =0.000). 
Overall, the evidence in table 8 suggests that the value of lead centrality is particularly 
high when the lead arranger lacks geographic, sector or borrower specific expertise, in support of 
hypothesis H4. 
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CHAPTER 6: ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Within-syndicate information asymmetries and skin in the game 
One possible explanation for the association between lead centrality and improved 
financing terms is that lead centrality is helpful in mitigating financing frictions that arise from 
within-syndicate information asymmetries  (Amiram et al., (2017); Ivashina, (2009) and Sufi, 
(2007)). That is, if central lead arrangers with better information channels are more effective at 
disseminating noisy information about borrowers to participant lenders, this could reduce price 
protection by participant lenders and lead to improved financing terms. A well known solution to 
the within-syndicate information asymmetry problem is for the lead arranger to have more skin 
in the game by holding a larger fraction of the loan at origination. In table 9, I explore the 
relation between lead arranger Centrality and the fraction of the loan held by the lead arranger at 
origination. Specifically, table 9 Columns (1) and (2) presents results of estimating equation 6.1 
for the sub-sample of loans with available information in DealScan on the fraction of the loan 
held by the lead arranger at origination, %Lead. 
 , 0 1 , 1 2 1,% _i t i t j j mLead Centrality Controls Fixed Effectsβ β β β− − += + + + + +   (7) 
The findings reveal that, consistent with lead centrality mitigating financing frictions that 
arise from within-syndicate information asymmetries, Centrality is negatively associated with 
the fraction of the loan held by the lead arranger at origination. A one unit increase in Centrality 
decreases the percentage of the loan held by the lead arranger in between 0.63% and 0.79%. In 
addition, in Column (3) of table 9, I estimate an augmented version of equation 6.1. The 
modification interacts the key explanatory variable (Centrality) in equation 6.1 with a composite 
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measure of the opaqueness of the borrower, (Opaque Comp). Opaque Comp is equal to the sum 
of the five indicator variables of borrower opaqueness used in the cross-sectional tests outlined in 
hypothesis H3 (i.e., Lo Numest, Has RD, Hi Tech, No Rated, No Big5). The key coefficient of 
interest in column (3) of table 9 is that on Centrality × Opaque Comp. The findings reveal that 
the effect of Centrality on the fraction of the loan held by the lead increases with the opaqueness 
of the borrower, which is expected since ‘within-syndicate’ information asymmetries are greater 
for borrowers that are harder to screen. 
While the evidence in table 9 is consistent with an information dissemination story in 
which more central lead arrangers use their positions of influence to mitigate within syndicate 
information asymmetries, this explanation need not be mutually exclusive from an information 
extraction story in which central lead arrangers gather valuable information through their 
network of past syndicate collaborations. I next examine a setting in which I expect within-
syndicate information symmetries to be either low or nonexistent. Specifically, in Columns (1) 
and (2) of table 10 I re-estimate equation 3.5 in a sample of loans issued to New firms, i.e., loans 
whose origination date is smaller than three years after the firms’ IPO date. In Columns (3) and 
(4) of table 10 I keep only loans in which the lead arranger is the sole lender. The key finding in 
columns (1) through (4) is that the coefficient on Centrality remains significantly negative in all 
specifications, which is consistent with at least part of the benefits of lead centrality stemming 
from information extraction rather than information dissemination, since within-syndicate 
information asymmetries are likely low in the new firms sub-sample, and non existent in the sole 
lender sub-sample. 
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6.2 Ex-Post Loan Performance 
The finding that lead centrality is associated with better financing terms raises the 
question of whether such price and non-price concessions are warranted, that is, whether loans 
granted by more central lead arrangers perform better ex-post. Testing for ex-post loan 
performance is complicated by the fact that DealScan does not provide loan-level performance 
data. Despite this limitation, I follow Gao and Jang, (2018), and measure loan performance based 
on estimated defaults. I consider that a loan defaults when the borrowing firms’ long term S&P 
credit rating drops to Default rate during the life of the loan. This limits my sample to the 22,141 
loans with some credit rating information available during their life. Only 5.8% of the loans in 
my sample default. Table 11 reports summary statistics for the estimation of a linear probability 
model in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable Default, that is equal to one if the 
loan defaults during its life, and zero otherwise. The key finding in 11 is that the coefficient on 
Centrality is significantly negative, which I interpret as evidence consistent with more central 
lead arrangers having better information at origination. 
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CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study addresses whether lead banks in a more central position in the global network 
of past syndicate collaborations offer more favorable financing terms than arrangers in more 
peripheral positions in the network. If networks of past syndicate collaborations stimulate 
information flows that mitigate financing frictions such as adverse selection and moral hazard 
concerns, then lead arrangers in a more central position in the network may be able to offer better 
financing terms than peripheral arrangers. I compute common measures of structural centrality 
from network theory using the global network of syndicate collaborations and test this prediction 
in a comprehensive sample of 41,447 US loans from 1987 to 2016. 
I find that lead centrality is an important factor in explaining both price and non-price 
loan terms. Controlling for a battery of loan-, firm- and bank- level variables that prior literature 
has found to predict loan terms, I find that loans granted by more central lead arrangers charge a 
lower loan spread than otherwise comparable loans granted by more peripheral arrangers. I find 
that the result of lead centrality on loan spread is robust to an array of plausible variations in the 
estimation procedure aimed at mitigating the possibility that the result is driven by omitted 
correlated variable bias. 
In addition, I find that arrangers in a more central position in the network of past 
syndicate collaborations grant loans that are typically larger, have longer maturities, and have a 
lower incidence of restrictive covenants than otherwise comparable loans granted by more 
peripheral arrangers. This is important because showing that non-price loan terms such as loan 
amounts, loan maturities and loan covenants respond to centrality in the same way loan spread 
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does, helps mitigate concerns that any price concessions warranted by more central leads are 
merely substituting for other, more restrictive non-price clauses elsewhere in the loan contract. If 
those trade-offs do occur, then the net effect of lead arranger centrality on loan terms becomes 
uncertain. 
To further substantiate my inferences and mitigate the potential for alternative 
explanations for more central lead arrangers charging a lower loan spread than peripheral 
arrangers, I conduct several additional tests to determine whether the effect of lead centrality on 
spread is stronger when the value of the information obtained through the leads network is likely 
to be higher. 
First, I predict that the information obtained from networks of past syndicate 
collaborations is likely higher when borrowers are relatively less transparent and harder to 
screen. I find evidence consistent with this prediction. Specifically, the effect of lead centrality 
on spread is higher for borrowing firms that are relatively less followed by analysts, for firms 
that do not have an S&P credit rating, for firms in high tech industries, for firms involved in 
R&D activities, and for firms whose financial statements are not audited by a Big5 audit firm. 
Second, I predict that the information obtained from networks of past syndicate 
collaborations is likely higher when the lender is ex-ante relatively less informed about the 
borrowing firm. This can occur when the lead arranger is new to the industry of the borrower, 
new to the geography, when the lead arranger is not a local bank, or when the lead arranger is not 
a relationship bank. Consistent with lead arrangers extracting valuable information through their 
network of past syndicate collaborations, I find evidence consistent with each of these 
predictions. 
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In addition, I find that the effect of lead centrality on spread remains significant in sub-
samples with low or nonexistent within-syndicate information asymmetries, which suggests that 
at least part of the benefits of lead centrality stem from lead arrangers extracting, rather than 
disseminating valuable information through their network. 
Finally, I find that holding observable covariates constant, ex-post loan performance 
increases with the centrality of the lead, which I interpret as evidence consistent with central 
leads having access to better information at origination. 
Taken together, this study’s findings contribute to the literature by exploring the extent to 
which loan contract terms are affected by networks of past professional relationships that emerge 
when teams in lending institutions collaborate in loan syndicates. While practitioners have 
emphasized the importance of information flows through networks of lending institutions for the 
success in the loan syndication business (see Campbell and Weaver, (2013) and Esty, (2001)) 
and the detailed discussion in section 2.4), there has been limited research effort directed to 












APPENDIX A - VARIABLES
Table 1: Variable Construction
Variable name Construction of Variable Source
Network Vars
Degree The degree of a node in a network is simply the count of the number of its adjacent nodes,
i.e, the number of distinct relationships a lending institution has established with other insti-
tutions through its collaboration in prior loan syndicates. I compute degree centrality using






where xi,j is 1 when institutions i and j collaborate in at least one syndicate, and n is the
number of nodes in the network. .
Dealscan
Betweenness The betweenness of a node measures the frequency witch which a node is located on the
shortest path between any other two nodes of the network. I compute betweenness centrality





, where G(k, j) are all the shortest paths existent between nodes k and j, and Gi(k, j) are all
the shortest paths between nodes k and j that go through node i.
Dealscan
Eigenvector Eigenvector centrality measures the extent to which a node is connected to many nodes that
are themselves central. That is, Eigenvector centrality is a variation of Degree centrality that
weighs each partner node by its importance (i.e, nodes that are connected to many peripheral
nodes receive a lower score than nodes that are connected to many nodes that are themselves







where Ωi,j is 1 when institutions i and j collaborate in at least one syndicate and λ is the
largest eigen-value of the adjacency matrix Ω. An adjacency matrix (or matrix of connec-
tions) is simply a convenient way of describing a network. A network composed by a set of
nodes or banks, B = {1, 2, · · · , n} and a set of links (or relationships between banks) ω. If
a link exists between banks i and j, we indicate it as (i, j) ∈ ω . The adjacency matrix is
the n × n matrix Ω = [Ωij] whose element Ωij , 0 whenever (i, j) ∈ ω. The network
is un-directed if links are such that Ω = ΩT , meaning that if bank A is connected to bank
B, then bank B is also connected to Bank A. A network is un-weighted if Ωi,j ∈ {0, 1},
meaning that connections are binary, banks are either connected or they are not, but there is
no weight assigned to the strength of the relationship.
Dealscan
Nscore Nscore is the average of the ranks of the three centrality measures: NScorei =




Leverage Leverage measured as long term debt plus debt in current liabilities over total assets. Com-
puted as (dltt+ dct)/at. Estimated the nearest year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat




Tangibility Measured as the ratio of property plant and equipment plus inventory over total assets. Com-
puted as (ppent+ invt)/at. Estimated the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Roa Return on Assets. Computed as ib/at. Estimated the year prior to the loan becoming active. Compustat
DLoss Indicator variable that takes a value of one for firms with negative income before extraordi-
nary operations. Estimated the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Capx_Intens The ratio of capx to total assets. Computed as capx/at. Missing capx values are set to zero.
Estimated the year prior to the loan becoming active.
Compustat
AltmanZ Altman’s Z Score. Computed as (1.2∗(act− lct)/at)+(1.4∗re/at)+(3.3∗(ni+xint+
txt)/at) + (0.6 ∗ csho ∗ prcc/lt) + (0.999 ∗ sale/at). Estimated in the year prior to the
loan activation date.
Compustat
DInvG Indicator variable that takes a value of one for firms with an S&P long term rating greater
than or equal to BBB-. Estimated in the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Lo_Numest Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the number of analyst following the firm
prior to the loan activation date is bellow the median.
Ibes
No_Rated Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm does not have an S&P long term
rating. Estimated in the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Has_Rd Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm reports positive R&D expenses.
Estimated in the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Hi_Tech Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm is in a high tech companies.
Based on Chuluun (2015), SIC codes of 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578 (computer hardware),
3661, 3663, 3669 (communications equipment), 3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679
(electronics), 3812 (navigation equipment), 3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829 (measuring and
controlling devices), 3841, 3845 (medical instruments), 4812, 4813 (telephone equipment),
4899 (communications services) and 7370, 7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378 and 7379
(software) are considered High Tech.
Compustat
No_Rated Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm does not have an S&P long term
rating. Estimated in the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
NBig5 Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the firm is not audited by a Big 5 Audit
Firm. Estimated in the year prior to the loan activation date.
Compustat
Opaque_Comp Composite measure of opaqueness equal to the sum of the five indicators NBig5 + No_Rated
+ Hi_Tech + Has_Rd + Lo_Numest
Compustat-
Ibes
New_Firm Indicator variable that takes a value of one for loans granted to firms in a date earlier than
IPO date plus 3 years. IPO date is equal to ipodate from Compustat when available, or equal
to the first fiscal year end with a valid stock price variable (prcc_f).
Compustat
Default Indicator variable that takes a value of one for loans whose firms’ long term Rating drops to
default category ("SD" or "D") during the life of the loan. Based on Gao and Jang (2018)
Compustat
Loan Vars
Spread Allindrawn spread above LIBOR of each loan (facility). All in drawn spread is the sum
of the spread over LIBOR plus any annual fees paid to the lender group. Negative or zero
values are set to missing
Dealscan
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LoanAmtLog Natural logarithm of the loan amount in million USD. Computed as log(1 +
facilityamt/1000000).
DealScan
MatLog Natural logarithm of the loan maturity in months. Computed as log(1+maturity). DealScan
DPerfricing Indicator variable that takes value 1 if the loan has a performance pricing pricing provision. DealScan
Nlenders Number of lenders that participate in the loan (facility). Computed as log(1 +
Numberofdistinctlendersinfacility)
Dealscan
Sole_Lender Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the loan is a sole lender loan. I.e., when the
bankallocation variable is equal to 100% or when the distribution method variable is equal
to "Sole Lender".
DealScan
DCovenants Indicator variable that takes a value of one when the loan has a financial or net worth
covenant.
DealScan
DSecured Idicator variable that takes value one if the loan is secured. DealScan
Bank Vars
BH_Reputation Indicator variable that takes value one if the parent bank holding company that arranges
the loan is either "Bank of America Merrill Lynch", "JP Morgan" or "City" or any of its
predecessors. Based on Ross (2010)
DealScan
BH_MktShare Market share of the parent institution that arranges the loan. Computed the calendar year
prior to the loan activation date.
DealScan
LA_Reputation Indicator variable that equals one if the Market Share of the lead arranger is greater than
2% in the year prior to the loan origination. Based on Bushman and Wittenberg-Moerman
(2012)
DealScan
Relationship Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the lead arranger has arranged at least one other
loan by the same borrower in the previous 5 years.
DealScan
First_Indus Indicator variable that takes a value of one if lead arranger has not arranged one or more
facilities in the same industry in previous 5 years.
DealScan
First_Geo Indicator variable that takes a value of one if the lead arranger has not arranged one or more
facilities in the same city in the previous 5 years
DealScan
Fixed Effects
Loan Purpose Indicator variable that takes a value of one for each of loan purposes in my sample (i.e,
whether a loan is used to finance an acquisition or whether a loan is used to execute a
leveraged buyout, etc)
DealScan
Multi_Lead Indicator variable that takes a value of one when there are multiple institutions with a Lead
Role in the loan.
DealScan
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APPENDIX B - EXAMPLES OF PRACTITIONERS DESCRIBING INFORMATION FLOWS IN
NETWORKS OF LENDING INSTITUTIONS.
[1]. When describing the pricing strategies of syndicating teams in lead arranger institutions:
"Enquiries with other banks can thus be undertaken only on the basis of trust between the individuals
concerned and it is this feature of the market which is perhaps the most important for a syndication unit,
the establishment of a rapport with competitors which does not breach the competitive spirit of the market
(any collusion as to pricing being, of course, unacceptable and contrary to competition law) and yet
provides for a two-way flow of information." Campbell and Weaver (2013) pp 260.
[2]. When describing the role personal relationships between individuals in lending teams of
arranging institutions:
"Unlike the worlds of bonds and equities, with their relatively straightforward products and large numbers
of investors, syndicated loans depend on fewer participants, and on the strength of relationships. It is a
personal market, in which individuals still know each other and deals are distributed in telephone
conversations or in e-mails, rather than with a couple of mouse-clicks. While a bond syndication may last
just a matter of hours, loans are usually less hurried and syndications still last days or weeks. The impact
of technology on syndicated lending has therefore been different from that on other asset classes, and the
focus is still on the technology aiding communication between people, rather than communication
between machines." Campbell and Weaver (2013) pp 66.
[3]. When Describing the importance of lending institutions nurturing a network of contacts to
gather information about credit policies and market sentiment:
"Detecting changes in lender behavior is a vital part of a syndicator’s job, and to be successful, a
practitioner must create and maintain his or her own network of contacts in order to keep abreast of
changes in market sentiment". Campbell and Weaver (2013) pp 23.
[4]. Emphasizing the importance of close connections with other banks when syndicating large
global project loans
The key to success in this business is being close to the market. This means being in touch with banks on
a weekly, if not daily, basis. We started with a universe of approximately 90 banks and created a target
lender list that might be interested in this deal. We then partitioned the target list into commitment size
categories and assigned participation probabilities for each category. This process gives us a sense of
liquidity and an indication of whether the deal will clear the market. Based on our analysis for the Disney
deal, we expected it would be oversubscribed by 57%. This kind of analysis illustrates our closeness to the
market and our confidence in the deal." Quote from Vivek Chandiramani, a member of the Chase Hong
Kong team that arranged the $3.3 billion Hong Kong Disneyland project loan in the year 2000 Esty (2001)
pp 88.
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APPENDIX C- EXAMPLE OF A SIMPLE NETWORK
Figure 1: Measures of structural centrality
Name deg betw eigen degrank100 eigenrank100 betwrank100 NScore N NC1
1 A 4 15.500 1 1 1 0.917 9.722 12 9
2 B 2 16 0.493 0.500 0.667 1 7.222 12 9
3 C 3 15 0.345 0.833 0.583 0.833 7.500 12 9
4 D 2 0 0.213 0.500 0.417 0.292 4.028 12 9
5 E 3 7 0.236 0.833 0.500 0.750 6.944 12 9
6 F 3 0.500 0.868 0.833 0.917 0.583 7.778 12 9
7 G 2 0 0.684 0.500 0.833 0.292 5.417 12 9
8 H 2 0 0.684 0.500 0.750 0.292 5.139 12 9
9 J 1 0 0.087 0.167 0.333 0.292 2.639 12 9
10 X 2 1 0 0.500 0.083 0.667 4.167 12 9
11 Y 1 0 0 0.167 0.250 0.292 2.361 12 9
12 I 1 0 0 0.167 0.167 0.292 2.083 12 9
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APPENDIX D - MAIN TABLES AND FIGURES
Figure 2: Network of loan syndicate participants. Each node is a participant in the syndicated Loan market
involved in at least one loan in a given quarter. Two nodes are connected when they are partners in at least
one loan in the quarter. The size of the node (syndicate lender) is proportional to its degree centrality. The
color of the nodes are based on their modularity class, an estimate of the extent to which nodes in the
network are highly connected within a cluster but are sparsely connected with other clusters. Panel A)
Corresponds to 1988 Quarter 4. Panel B corresponds to a quarter during the financial crisis 2008 Quarter 4
and panel C corresponds to 2016 Quarter 4.
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Figure 3: This figure presents the total number of institutions that collaborate in at least one loan with
some other institution (in dark blue). In light blue I show how many of those institutions are connected to
the largest connected component of the Network.
55
Figure 4: The figures below show the evolution of the network of syndicate Lenders with time. Fig A)
shows the evolution of the network density. Density captures the proportion of the total number of edges
that are realized (i.e, a bank was connected to around 30% of all other banks in the late 1990s, but this has
decreased to around 2% in recent years. Fig B) sows the evolution of the Average Shortest Path of the
Network. Fig C) shows the evolution of Network Diameter. Diameter is the maximum shortest path
between two banks in the Network. Fig D) shows the evolution of Transitivity. Transitivity captures the
average probability that if bank A is connected to bank B and bank B is connected with bank C, then what
is the average probability that bank A is also connected with bank C.
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Table 2: Sample selection
Facilities Packages Lenders Borrowers Comment
1 344, 953 237, 028 20, 196 87, 909 Global Syndicate Sample
2 338, 673 233, 198 11, 526 86, 318 Keep lead roles only
3 338, 673 233, 198 6, 317 86, 318 Keep one lead arranger only
4 102, 710 73, 656 3, 077 17, 447 Link to compustat withing 720 days prior
to dealactivedate
5 76, 864 52, 732 2, 626 13, 375 Remove finance and utilities
6 69, 254 48, 141 2, 409 12, 494 Keep only USD denominated
7 68, 765 47, 794 2, 402 12, 453 Loans between 1987 and 2016
8 41, 447 28, 700 1, 583 8, 726 Require complete cases for main equation
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Table 3: Descriptives: This table presents summary statistics for all variables in the sample of 41,447 loans
from 1987 to 2016 used in the main analysis. Definitions of all variables are shown in Appendix A.
Summary Statistics:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES N mean sd p25 p50 p75
Degree 41,447 0.192 0.131 0.0796 0.187 0.292
Betweennes 41,447 0.0137 0.0146 0.00107 0.00745 0.0256
Eigenvector 41,447 0.612 0.310 0.379 0.674 0.889
N_Score 41,447 7.597 2.435 6.368 8.522 9.519
Hi_Centrality 41,447 0.461 0.499 0 0 1
Spread 41,447 222.8 148.4 112.5 200 300
Leverage 41,447 0.308 0.223 0.147 0.281 0.428
AtLog 41,447 6.556 2.040 5.115 6.556 7.954
Tangibility 41,447 0.446 0.238 0.261 0.445 0.628
Roa 41,447 0.0142 0.129 -0.000463 0.0381 0.0726
Dloss 41,447 0.251 0.434 0 0 1
Capx_Intens 41,447 0.0650 0.0692 0.0227 0.0427 0.0793
AltmanZ 41,447 3.376 3.248 1.653 2.750 4.245
DInvG 41,447 0.195 0.396 0 0 0
Low_Numest 41,447 0.500 0.500 0 1 1
No_Rated 41,447 0.571 0.495 0 1 1
Has_Rd 41,447 0.409 0.492 0 0 1
NBig5 41,447 0.137 0.344 0 0 0
Opaque_Composite 41,447 1.745 1.158 1 2 3
LoanAmtLog 41,447 4.534 1.743 3.258 4.615 5.787
MatLog 41,447 3.693 0.699 3.367 4.060 4.111
DPerfpricing 41,447 0.357 0.479 0 0 1
NLenders 41,447 1.776 0.884 0.693 1.792 2.398
DSecured 41,447 0.574 0.495 0 1 1
DCovenants 41,447 0.507 0.500 0 1 1
BH_Reputation 41,447 0.518 0.500 0 1 1
BH_MarketShare 41,447 0.0737 0.0635 0.0147 0.0544 0.120
LA_Reputation 41,447 0.467 0.499 0 0 1
Relationship 41,447 0.340 0.474 0 0 1
New_Indus 41,447 0.195 0.396 0 0 0
New_Geo 41,447 0.149 0.356 0 0 0
Not_LocalLead 31,855 0.807 0.395 1 1 1
New_Firm 41,447 0.154 0.361 0 0 0
Default 22,141 0.0585 0.235 0 0 0
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Table 4: The effect of lead centrality on loan spread - Each observation in the analysis corresponds to
one loan facility. The dependent variable in columns 1 through 5 is Spread, the interest margin over the
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) for each loan. The main coefficient of interest is that on
Centrality. Centrality measures the wellconnectedness of the lead arranger in the network of past syndicate
collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by Degree in column (1), by Eigenvector in column (2), by
Betweenness in column (3), and by NScore in columns (4) and (5). NScore is the average of the yearly
percentile ranks of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e, Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). All
specifications include Firm, Loan and Lender level control variables as well as fixed effects for the purpose
of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for whether the syndicate has more than one lender with a lead role,
Multi_Lead; and the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE. Columns (1) through (4) include industry fixed
effects Indus_FE; while column (5) includes borrower fixed effects Firm_FE. Appendix A presents a
detailed description of all the variables. t-statistics (in parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard
errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Deg Eigenv Betw NScore NScore
Centrality −74.186∗∗∗ −38.663∗∗∗ −23.835∗∗∗ −5.321∗∗∗ −4.584∗∗∗
(−10.11) (−12.68) (−4.25) (−14.18) (−10.93)
MatLog −12.542∗∗∗ −12.473∗∗∗ −13.055∗∗∗ −12.235∗∗∗ −9.082∗∗∗
(−10.13) (−10.07) (−10.52) (−9.87) (−7.34)
LoanAmtLog −17.082∗∗∗ −16.961∗∗∗ −17.621∗∗∗ −16.843∗∗∗ −16.885∗∗∗
(−18.41) (−18.34) (−18.92) (−18.22) (−17.98)
NLenders −1.877 −1.848 −2.504∗ −2.012 −2.994∗∗
(−1.46) (−1.44) (−1.95) (−1.57) (−2.22)
DPerfpricing −27.147∗∗∗ −26.340∗∗∗ −27.018∗∗∗ −25.881∗∗∗ −24.560∗∗∗
(−16.08) (−15.59) (−15.99) (−15.32) (−13.91)
DSecured 54.830∗∗∗ 54.321∗∗∗ 55.426∗∗∗ 54.033∗∗∗ 37.803∗∗∗
(30.89) (30.63) (31.22) (30.50) (18.62)
DCovenants −10.962∗∗∗ −11.183∗∗∗ −10.601∗∗∗ −11.273∗∗∗ −6.409∗∗∗
(−5.49) (−5.61) (−5.30) (−5.67) (−3.15)
DtermB 49.499∗∗∗ 50.360∗∗∗ 49.131∗∗∗ 50.511∗∗∗ 36.792∗∗∗
(16.55) (16.83) (16.43) (16.89) (12.79)
Drevolver −37.040∗∗∗ −36.863∗∗∗ −37.227∗∗∗ −36.732∗∗∗ −37.631∗∗∗
(−23.97) (−23.89) (−24.01) (−23.85) (−26.01)
Leverage 51.899∗∗∗ 52.570∗∗∗ 51.523∗∗∗ 53.017∗∗∗ 41.104∗∗∗
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(10.77) (10.92) (10.67) (11.01) (6.51)
AtLog −8.408∗∗∗ −8.268∗∗∗ −8.938∗∗∗ −8.135∗∗∗ −8.563∗∗∗
(−8.75) (−8.62) (−9.21) (−8.48) (−5.36)
Tangibility −15.515∗∗∗ −15.760∗∗∗ −14.615∗∗∗ −15.754∗∗∗ −8.758
(−2.90) (−2.95) (−2.73) (−2.96) (−1.00)
Roa −77.077∗∗∗ −76.037∗∗∗ −77.470∗∗∗ −75.181∗∗∗ −69.989∗∗∗
(−7.90) (−7.82) (−7.90) (−7.75) (−5.95)
Dloss 40.766∗∗∗ 40.524∗∗∗ 40.879∗∗∗ 40.461∗∗∗ 30.665∗∗∗
(16.66) (16.58) (16.66) (16.55) (11.93)
Capx_Intens −28.709∗ −28.687∗ −28.633∗ −28.671∗ −56.914∗∗∗
(−1.74) (−1.73) (−1.74) (−1.73) (−3.10)
AltmanZ −2.583∗∗∗ −2.555∗∗∗ −2.607∗∗∗ −2.546∗∗∗ −2.624∗∗∗
(−8.34) (−8.27) (−8.37) (−8.27) (−6.54)
DInvG −16.498∗∗∗ −16.933∗∗∗ −15.547∗∗∗ −17.254∗∗∗ −17.832∗∗∗
(−6.68) (−6.85) (−6.26) (−6.99) (−4.87)
Relationship −3.741∗∗∗ −2.610∗ −5.567∗∗∗ −2.217 −2.620∗∗
(−2.71) (−1.89) (−4.05) (−1.61) (−1.99)
BH_Repu −11.276∗∗∗ −10.427∗∗∗ −14.328∗∗∗ −10.025∗∗∗ −11.783∗∗∗
(−7.08) (−6.57) (−8.90) (−6.34) (−6.46)
Observations 41447 41447 41447 41447 41447
Adjusted R2 0.548 0.550 0.546 0.551 0.660
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm_FE Yes
60
Table 5: Robustness of the effect of lead centrality on loan spread - Each observation in the analysis
corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable in columns 1 through 4 in both panel A and panel
B is Spread, the interest margin over the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) for each loan. The main
coefficient of interest is that on Centrality in all columns except for columns (2) and (3) in Panel B in
which the coefficient of interest is that on Hi_Centrality. Centrality measures the well-connectedness of the
lead arranger in the network of past syndicate collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by NScore in all
specifications. NScore is the average of the yearly percentile ranks of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e,
Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). Hi_Centrality is an indicator variable that equals 1 when NScore is
above the sample median in each year. All specifications include Firm-, Loan- and Lender- level control
variables as well as fixed effects for the purpose of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for whether the syndicate has
more than one lender with a lead role, Multi_Lead; and the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE.
Panel A reports results of plausible variations of equation 5. Column (1) in Panel A uses an alternative
control variable for lead arranger reputation by replacing BH_Reputation, an indicator variable that takes a
value of 1 if the lenders bank holding company is either "Bank of America Merrill Lynch", "JP Morgan" or
"Citi", or any of their predecessors (based on Ross (2010); with a measure of the market share of the lead
arrangers’ bank holding company in the year prior to the loan origination, BH_MktShare. Column (2) in
Panel A estimates equation 5 but uses an alternative control variable for lead arranger reputation by
replacing BH_Reputation, with LA_Reputation, an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the lead
arranger has a market share greater than 2% in the year prior to loan origination (based on Bushman and
Wittenberg-Moerman (2012)). Column (3) estimates equation 5 but excludes observations in which more
than one lender in the syndicate have a lead role. Column (4) estimates equation 5 but excludes
observations in which the lead arrangers’ bank holding company is either "Bank of America Merrill
Lynch", "JP Morgan" or "Citi", or any of their predecessors.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BH_MktSh LA_Repu Multi_Lead=0 BH_Repu=0
Centrality −5.416∗∗∗ −6.331∗∗∗ −7.048∗∗∗ −5.876∗∗∗
(−9.72) (−9.36) (−11.38) (−10.31)
Observations 41447 41447 20278 19993
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.550 0.505 0.495
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Panel B reports results of alternative specifications to test for the effect of lead centrality on spread.
Column (1) in panel B includes lead lender fixed effects; Bank_FE. Column (2) in panel B replaces the
dependent variable of interest, Centrality with a dichotomous variable Hi_Centrality. Column (3)
corresponds to a specification that uses entropy balancing to ensure covariate balance between treatment
(i.e., Hi_Centrality = 1) and control groups (i.e., Hi_Centrality = 0). Column (4) estimates equation 5 but
only for borrowing firms with a credit rating and using a much more restrictive fixed effects structure.
Specificaly, IRI_FE includes Industry× Rating× Year fixed effects. Appendix A presents a detailed
description of all the variables. tstatistics (in parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard errors
clustered by firm. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)





Observations 41447 41447 41447 17769
Adjusted R2 0.606 0.547 0.567 0.707
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes




Table 6: The effect of lead centrality on nonprice loan characteristics - Each observation in the
analysis corresponds to one loan facility. In panel A, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
loan amount, LoanAmtLog, in columns (1) and (2) and the natural logarithm of the loan maturity in
months, MatLog, in columns (3) and (4). In panel B, the dependent variable is an indicator variable of
whether the deal has a covenant, Dcovenant, in columns (1) and (2) and an indicator variable of whether
the deal has is Secured, DSecured, in columns (3) and (4). The main coefficient of interest is that on
Centrality. Centrality measures the well-connectedness of the lead arranger in the network of past
syndicate collaborations, measured as NScore in all columns. All specifications include Firm-, Loan- and
Lender- level control variables as well as fixed effects for the purpose of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for
whether the syndicate has more than one lender with a lead role, Multi_Lead; and the year of the loan
initiation, Year_FE. Columns (1), (3) include industry fixed effects Indus_FE; while columns (2), (4)
include borrower fixed effects Firm_FE. Appendix A presents a detailed description of all the variables.
t-statistics (in parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A - Loan Amounts and Maturities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LoanAmtLog LoanAmtLog MatLog MatLog
Centrality 0.033∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(10.61) (8.07) (8.25) (4.46)
Observations 41447 41447 41447 41447
Adjusted R2 0.75 0.79 0.28 0.38
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Purpose_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes




Panel B - Covenants and Collateral
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DCovenants DCovenants DSecured DSecured
Centrality −0.006∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗
(−4.53) (−3.97) (−8.67) (−5.07)
Observations 41447 41447 41447 41447
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.59 0.36 0.52
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Purpose_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 7: The effect of lead centrality on spread conditional on measures of borrower transparency - I
separately examine the effect of lead centrality on loan spread for sub-samples of high and low
transparency borrowers. The dependent variable in all columns is Spread, the interest margin over the
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) for each loan. The main coefficient of interest is that on
Centrality in all columns, which measures the well-connectedness of the lead arranger in the network of
past syndicate collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by NScore, which is the average of the yearly
percentile ranks of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e, Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). In panel A
columns (1) and (2) I separately examine sub-samples of high and low number of analyst following the
firm, respectively. High analyst following corresponds to the sub-sample of borrowers with above median
number of analyst following the firm in each year of my sample. The number of analyst following are
calculated in the year prior to the loan origination. In panel A columns (3) and (4) I separately examine
sub-samples of borrowers with and without a long term credit rating, respectively. In panel B columns (1)
and (2) I separately examine borrowers in industries other than HighTech and borrowers in High Tech,
respectively (based on Chuluun (2015)). In panel B columns (3) and (4) I separately examine sub-samples
of borrowers without positive R&D expenditures and borrowers with positive R&D expenditures in the
year prior to loan origination, respectively. In panel C columns (1) and (2) I separately examine
sub-samples of borrowers audited by Big5 Audit firms and borrowers not audited by a Big5 Audit firm in
the year prior to loan origination, respectively. All specifications include Firm-, Loan- and Lender- level
control variables as well as fixed effects for the purpose of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for whether the
syndicate has more than one lender with a lead role, Multi_Lead; the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE,
and industry fixed effects; Indus_FE, with the exception of columns (1) and (2) in Panel B that exclude the
industry fixed effects. Appendix A presents a detailed description of all the variables. t-statistics (in
parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A - Analyst following and Ratings
(1) (2) (3) (4)
High Analyst Low Analyst Rated Not Rated
Centrality −3.286∗∗∗ −6.024∗∗∗ −3.059∗∗∗ −6.140∗∗∗
(−5.88) (−12.22) (−4.70) (−13.44)
Observations 20723 20724 17769 23678
Adjusted R2 0.588 0.442 0.621 0.489
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample split χ̃2 p-value χ̃2 p-value
Centrality 15.833 0.000 15.243 0.000
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Panel B - High Tech and R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not High Tech High Tech No R&D Has R&D
Centrality −4.999∗∗∗ −6.909∗∗∗ −3.951∗∗∗ −7.466∗∗∗
(−12.33) (−7.31) (−8.19) (−12.64)
Observations 36137 5310 24515 16932
Adjusted R2 0.551 0.563 0.526 0.593
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample split χ̃2 p-value χ̃2 p-value
Centrality 3.496 0.061 21.382 0.000
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Panel C - Big 5 Auditor
(1) (2)











Sample split χ̃2 p-value
Centrality 4.039 0.044
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Table 8: The effect of lead centrality on spread conditional on measures of ex-ante lead expertise - I
separately examine the effect of lead centrality on loan spread for sub-samples of high and low lead
arranger expertise. The dependent variable in all columns is Spread, the interest margin over the LIBOR
(London Interbank Offered Rate) for each loan. The main coefficient of interest is that on Centrality in all
columns, which measures the well-connectedness of the lead arranger in the network of past syndicate
collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by NScore, which is the average of the yearly percentile ranks
of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e, Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). In panel A columns (1)
and (2) I separately examine sub-samples of loans arranged by Relationship banks vs Non Relationship
banks. A lead arranger is a Relationship bank when it has had a lead role in some other loan by the same
borrower in the five years prior to the loan initiation date. In panel A columns (3) and (4) I separately
examine sub-samples of loans arranged by banks with industry expertise vs banks with no industry
expertise. A lead bank is considered to have no industry expertise when it is the first time that it arranges a
loan for a borrower in the same two digit sic code over the five years prior to the loan origination. In panel
B columns (1) and (2) I separately examine sub-samples of loans arranged by banks with geography
expertise vs banks with no geography expertise. A lead bank is considered to have no geography expertise
when it is the first time that it arranges a loan for a borrower in the same state over the five years prior to
the loan origination. In panel B columns (3) and (4) I separately examine sub-samples of loans arranged by
banks headquartered in the same state as the borrower vs banks headquartered in a different state than the
borrower. All specifications include Firm-, Loan- and Lender- level control variables as well as fixed
effects for the purpose of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for whether the syndicate has more than one lender with
a lead role, Multi_Lead; the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE, and industry fixed effects; Indus_FE.
Appendix A presents a detailed description of all the variables. t-statistics (in parentheses) in all
regressions are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A - Relationship and Industry prior experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relationship No Relationship No NewIndus NewIndus
Centrality −3.071∗∗∗ −5.939∗∗∗ −4.599∗∗∗ −7.956∗∗∗
(−3.85) (−14.84) (−8.91) (−11.28)
Observations 14103 27344 32917 8073
Adjusted R2 0.588 0.526 0.566 0.500
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
L_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample split χ̃2 p-value χ̃2 p-value
Centrality 11.484 0.001 15.688 0.000
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Panel B - Geography prior experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not New Geo New Geo Same state Out of State
Centrality −3.998∗∗∗ −7.963∗∗∗ −3.867∗∗∗ −7.447∗∗∗
(−8.33) (−10.42) (−4.60) (−13.15)
Observations 32531 6161 6158 25697
Adjusted R2 0.565 0.499 0.555 0.577
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Loan_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Indus_FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample split χ̃2 p-value χ̃2 p-value
Centrality 20.769 0.000 12.770 0.000
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APPENDIX E - TABLES IN ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS
Table 9: Lead centrality and skin in the game - This table reports the results of OLS regressions
investigating the effect of lead centrality on the fraction of the loan held by the lead arranger at origination.
Each observation in the analysis corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable in all columns is
% Loan Held by Lead. I include Firm, Loan and Lender level control variables as well as fixed effects for
whether the syndicate has more than one lender with a lead role, Multi_Lead; the year of the loan initiation,
Year_FE and industry fixed effects Indus_FE. Appendix A presents a detailed description of all the
variables. t-statistics (in parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *,
**, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3)
% Held by Lead % Held by Lead % Held by Lead




Centrality × Opaque_Composite −0.292∗∗∗
(−4.61)
Observations 15468 15468 15468
Adjusted R2 0.837 0.888 0.837
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Loan_Purpose Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes




Table 10: The effect of lead centrality on spread in a sample with low within syndicate information
asymmetries - This table reports the results of OLS regressions investigating the effect of lead centrality
on loan spread in a sub sample of loans and firms where there likely are no within-syndicate information
asymmetries. Each observation in the analysis corresponds to one loan facility. The dependent variable in
columns 1 through 4 is Spread, the interest margin over the LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) for
each loan. Columns (1) and (2) estimate equation 5 in a sub-sample of New Firms, that is, loans that are
within 3 years of the firms IPO date. Columns (3) and (4) estimate equation Spread for a sub-sample of
loans where the lead bank keeps 100% of the loan at origination. The main coefficient of interest is that on
Centrality. Centrality measures the wellconnectedness of the lead arranger in the network of past syndicate
collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by NScore in all columns. NScore is the average of the yearly
percentile ranks of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e, Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). All
specifications include Firm, Loan and Lender level control variables as well as fixed effects for the purpose
of the loan, Loan_Purpose; for whether the syndicate has more than one lender with a lead role,
Multi_Lead; and the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE. Columns (1) and (3) include industry fixed effects
Indus_FE; while columns (2) and (4) includes borrower fixed effects Firm_FE. Appendix A presents a
detailed description of all the variables. t-statistics (in parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard
errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
New_Firms New_Firms Sole_Lender Sole_Lender
Centrality −5.488∗∗∗ −6.365∗∗∗ −8.530∗∗∗ −5.401∗∗∗
(−6.70) (−4.59) (−11.38) (−4.64)
Observations 6376 6376 5945 5945
Adjusted R2 0.453 0.702 0.425 0.680
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects
Loan_Purpose Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multi_Lead Yes Yes Yes Yes




Table 11: Ex-Post Loan Performance - This table reports the results of OLS regressions investigating the
effect of lead centrality on loan default. The dependent variable is Default. The main coefficient of interest
is that on Centrality. Centrality measures the wellconnectedness of the lead arranger in the network of past
syndicate collaborations. Lead centrality is measured by NScore. NScore is the average of the yearly
percentile ranks of each of the raw centrality scores (i.e, Degree, Betweenness and Eigenvector). I include
Firm, Loan and Lender level control variables as well as fixed effects for whether the syndicate has more
than one lender with a lead role, Multi_Lead; the year of the loan initiation, Year_FE and industry fixed
effects Indus_FE. Appendix A presents a detailed description of all the variables. t-statistics (in
parentheses) in all regressions are based on standard errors clustered by firm. *, **, *** indicate
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